OIL EXPLORATION AND NIGERIA'S UNDERDEVELOPMENT: THE NEED TO ESCAPE THE NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE
Keywords:
Curse, Corruption, Institutions, Natural resourceAbstract
This paper examines the nature of the natural resource curse in Nigeria. The country has actively engaged in oil exploration for about six decades and is Africa's largest producer of oil resources. During the oil boom of the 1970s, oil was the primary source of government revenue, amounting to 80% of total income. The paper adopts content analysis of mainly secondary sources to examine the research problem at stake using the resource curse theory. Findings reveal poor political institutions, corruption and lack of accountability, weak executive control of oil resource governance with apparent inadequate checks and balances, and the resultant conflicts and clashes of interests, manipulations, and inflation of oil contracts with favouritism in allocating oil blocs. Therefore, this article submits that to ensure optimal benefits to all citizenry; measures must be adopted in building political institutions, reforming the Niger Delta Development Commission, diversification, building a welfare state, equitable distribution of oil wealth, and the sovereign wealth fund and the imposition of direct tax. Finally, the paper argues that escaping the natural resource curse is challenging but possible.
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