CONSOLIDATING THE GAINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN COMBATING TERRORISM FOR ENHANCED NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA: KUJE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY ATTACK IN PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT
This paper examined the gains of intelligence gathering in combating terrorism for enhanced national security in Nigeria, especially the recent attack on the Kuje Correctional Facility in Abuja. The paper adopted an Expost-facto research design and made use of secondary sources of data while the Social Identity Theory was employed as the explicatory framework. The paper posited that the reasons behind the attack is due to inadequate staff and the fact that the Nigerian correctional system is deficient in the deployment of prison intelligence and dynamic security strategies that are supposed to conform with global practices. The paper thus recommended, among others, that there should be an urgent deployment of modern security gadgets and support across the Correctional facilities in Nigeria because Intelligence support can be a valuable tool to assist law enforcement agencies in the performance of their daily duties.

Keywords: Intelligence, Intelligence gathering, National Security, Terrorism, Nigeria Correctional Service

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INTRODUCTION

A major counterterrorism measure that is widely applied in most states in the fight against terrorism is the use of security intelligence services. Intelligence gathering involves any secret information, together with the activities involved in producing or procuring it, designed to ensure and or enhance national and global security (Martin, 2016). The fact that there are security problems that intelligence services addresses are transnational, has created the necessity for cooperation among intelligence service agencies in different states with other intelligence services in the respective region and abroad to share intelligence. Intelligence sharing contributes significantly to other counterterrorism strategies whereas according to Nte (2011), it contributes significantly to both defensive and offensive strategies making it fundamental in collective strategies in the fight against transnational terrorism. Its main advantages include its strong ability to uncertainty reduction, provision of early warning as well as provide insight into policy-making in fighting terrorist attacks (Martin, 2016). Therefore, Intelligence gathering and sharing serve two purposes: informing policy and supporting police, military or covert operations directed towards enhancing state security (Nte, 2011).

In Africa, different states have also established different intelligence-sharing mechanisms. For instance, in Nigeria, Nte (2011) explains that Intelligence gathering and sharing is attached to several institutions in charge of the country's internal and external security including the Nigeria Police; Nigerian Armed Forces; Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA); Security and Criminal Intelligence Bureau of Nigerian Police; Nigeria Immigration Services; Directorate of State Security Services; among others. Nte (2011) adds that each institution has rules and regulations designed to ensure the security of intelligence, which makes information classification to restricted, confidential, secret and top secret to remain a permanent feature within the system.

The origin of Western prisons service in Nigeria is traceable to the colonial regime in 1861 during the time their administration was preoccupied with the bane of safeguarding their businesses and also to protect the missionaries (Orakwe, 2018). And by 1861, the then Acting

Governor of Lagos Colony who was also a British merchant in Lagos, put a police force of about 25 constables in place; followed in 1863 by the establishment of four (4) courts which included: a police court meant to resolve minor disputes, a criminal court meant to try more serious cases, a slave court meant to try cases arising from the efforts to abolish the trade in slaves, and as well a commercial court meant to resolve disputes arising among the colonial merchants and traders (Nigeria Prisons Service, 2018).

The Nigeria's Prisons Service (now Nigerian Correctional Services) is headed by the Controller General of Prisons, and the 'Services' is a government agency situated under the Ministry of Interior and is administered by a body known to be the Civil Defense, Correctional, Fire and Immigration Services Board (CDCFIB 2019). The modern Nigerian Prison Service (now Correctional Services) derives its operational powers from the Nigerian Correctional Service Act (2019). This Act repels CAP P29 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. The Nigerian Correctional Service Act (2019) divides the Service into both Custodial and Non–Custodial Services (Nigerian Correctional Service Act 2019).

For the past two decades now, the Nigerian correctional centres across the states have witnessed one form of jail or prison breaks or the other (Ripples Nigeria Report, 2017). Various prison breaks have taken place at the prisons in Kogi, Ekiti, Ondo, Minna, Bauchi, Damaturu, and Owerri, among others in Nigeria. However, despite the various forewarning signals, prison officials have usually been caught up in one prison break or the other in the country; as the inmates broke loose after the expiration of the ultimatum and forewarning rolled out to the Service by the hoodlums. Information on impending riots or prison breaks is usually rolled out to the prison officials before the incidents occur, and a good number of these "breaks" are known to the authorities beforehand but they would never take any viable measure to forestall the phenomena (Jack, 2016).

It is against the backdrop of the upsurge in incidences of attack by banditry and other terrorist groups in recent times across correctional facilities in Nigeria that the paper seeks to examine the

gains of intelligence gathering and sharing among the security agencies and the phenomenon of terrorism as it affects the national security in Nigeria. For the purpose of analytical progression, this paper is divided into five sections apart from the introductory aspect. The first section deals with the conceptual clarifications and theoretical framework while the second section traces the overview of the attack and factors that promote the attack on Kuje Correctional facility in Abuja. The third section reviews the Correctional Service intelligence process and circle. The fourth section review gains and effects of intelligence gathering in combating terrorism for enhanced National security in Nigeria. The fifth section offers the conclusion and recommendations

CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

National security remains a fundamental function of any responsible government. Security in general is people's relative feeling of being secure from economic, political, social cultural and psychological fear. Insecurity is people's relative feeling of the presence of economic, political, social cultural and psychological fear. Among these, economic insecurity is very important since it has to do with the absence of jobs, basic health care, access to education and various long-term needs of various people in society. Therefore, security involves the ability to peruse cherished political and social ambitions. On the other hand, to Elaigwu (2013) security is the ability of a state to ward off all forms of threats external to its survival these include internal stability and predictability of the system.

National security as a concept once meant military power consisting of defence, prosecution of the war, disposition of armed forces nuclear weapons, activities of securities and intelligence services. National security is to safeguard national values (Okechukwu and Ogochukwu, 2018). On the other hand, Babaginda (2011) sees national security as the physical defence and protection of citizens as well as the promotion of economic well-being and prosperity of citizens that in turn promotes the attainment of national interest.

It is important to note that National Security consists of military national security which entails the readiness of the country's security

organizations' ability to protect the territorial integrity of the nation through military equipment and from external aggression and non-military national security which entails infrastructural development, poverty reduction, employment opportunities, provision of healthcare facilities, educational advancement, employment opportunities as well as investment opportunities. When military national security exists and non-military national security does not exist or vice versa as the case may be the country has not attained national security.

CONCEPT OF TERRORISM

Terrorism as a term seems a bit difficult to define as several scholars have tried depending on how they view it. To Bozimo (2010) terrorism is a calculated use of violence and non-violence or threat of both to intimidate oppress and suppress people into submission, usually to achieve certain goals. Crensham (2011) observes that the concept of terrorism is subjective and pejorative, due to the conditions that push persons to engage in terrorist activities. He notes that terrorism is any act that is intended to cause death or severe bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when such purposes or act by nature is to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act.

The amount of violence is often disproportionate, apparently random and deliberately symbolic to hit a target which has the intention of conveying a message to awaken the public to perceived injustice. Terrorism as a concept is an immensely complex phenomenon that portrays different perceptions. Terrorism includes different kinds of activities, such as assassination, murder, kidnapping, sabotage/vandalism, arson, biochemical attacks, exotic pollution, rail derailment, violation of diplomatic immunity, ambush/barricade arms smuggling, among other opprobrious acts of crimes and violence.

The history of terrorism in Nigeria is traceable to the emergence of a group of Islamic militants called "Boko Haram" in 2002. "Boko Haram" is translated to mean "western education is evil". The progressive destructive activities of "Boko Haram" made the US department of states to designate them as a terrorist organization in

November 2013 (Wikipedia). Boko Haram or JASDJ is an Islamist terrorist group operating in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group aspires to establish a Sharia State in Nigeria and West Africa, destabilise the Nigerian government and remove western influence from the country. The group was formerly linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On 12 March 2015, Daesh (formerly referred to as ISIL) accepted a pledge of allegiance from Boko Haram. In August 2016, the group split into 2 factions: Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) and JASDJ or Boko Haram.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

Intelligence according to Martin (2016), there is yet to be established consensus on the definition of intelligence due to the diverse understanding across states and agencies on what constitutes intelligence, as well as the fact that it continues to evolve with the dynamism in the security environment varies across states and agencies. As a result, the term precisely varies in meaning among people and governments. The question then is, how do the definitions differ and how does this affect its application in the fight against terrorism? This necessitates a critical review of some of the definitions by scholars on intelligence gathering.

According to Flavius-Cristian and Andreea (2013), intelligence is information that has been processed so that it contains a particular meaning for a given recipient. This definition however ignores the fact that if the meaning does not address national security interests, it cannot suffice in the state security arena. A more elaborate definition by Martin (2016) states that intelligence is any secret information, together with the activities conducted to produce or procure it, designed to maintain or improve national and international security. This definition however excludes open sources which are also sources of information that may be of national or international security interest. According to Walsh (2010), intelligence gathering entails collecting both secret information and information in the public domain, protecting and analyzing it to minimize decision-makers' uncertainty regarding a foreign policy issue.

This definition is limited because it does not take into account that intelligence gathering is not a question of foreign policy issues only but domestic security problems as well.

Intelligence gathering is done for a state by agencies set by the government, where the government's executive arm is the principal recipient and user of the intelligence. Dailey (2017) highlights different forms of intelligence including: "Signals Intelligence (SIGINT); Human Intelligence (HUMINT); Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT); Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT); and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)." Signals intelligence entails information collected from communications interception; human intelligence entails information obtained through the direct personal involvement of officers with persons; while open source intelligence includes information obtained from publically available materials. There has been a significant evolution of intelligence gathering over the past years that reflect the dynamism-like threats as well as the changes in opinion among the public and political divide.

During the cold war, HUMINT was dominant (Martin, 2016). However, with the advances in technology, the focus diverted to SIGINT in the 1950s and 60s. That is, technology is considered more reliable was preferred to the human factor, hence interception of communications became common (Bellaby, 2014). Emphasis on technology went on with less controversy until the 9/11 attacks happened. The attacks depicted a failure in understanding the emerging terrorist threats and hence stirred the necessity for refocusing on HUMINT and advancing SIGINT to deter more attacks. As a result, since then, there has been an increment in technical capabilities available to intelligence agencies and an expansion in collecting of signals to exceptional levels. However, the fact that terrorism has also continuously prevailed questions the effectiveness of the reforms that have taken place. There is therefore a necessity for interrogation of what reforms have taken place in intelligence gathering in different contexts and what have been the implications of these reforms on the trends in transnational terrorism.

Intelligence gathering is done within a context characterized by high secrecy. Nonetheless, the degree of the requisite secrecy for effectiveness poses a major dilemma. Best and Cumming (2017) posit that analysis of intelligence is highly dependent on open sources, but the information is turned into a secret' upon getting into the Intelligence gathering and Sharing system. Nonetheless, as Martin (2016) highlights, the importance of secrecy applies not only to the information alone but also to the methods applied in gathering it as well as the sources from which it was obtained. Thus, though the basis for intelligence goes beyond classified materials, it is critical to observe secrecy to have adequate knowledge required for prevention and forewarning against possible attacks. If the information is meant to help prevent an attack, the question, therefore, is how intelligence is gathering still effective if the information has to remain undercover.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper adopted the social identity theory as a basis for the explanation of a terrorist attack on a correctional facility in Nigeria. Essentially, the social identity theory is important so much so that it provides useful insight into the understanding of the several identity issues that have plagued the Nigerian plural society over time in terms of insecurity. The relevance of this theory to any national discourse has been further amplified by scholars such as Brannan et al cited in Arena and Arrigo (2010). To these scholars, social identity theory captures the significant social phenomena and brings to bear a group's internally constructed social identity as well as the extent to which some of these groups instil consciousness in the minds and hearts of their members. The multiplier effects of this kind of social group orientation grow over time and tend to increase the character of violence that can become a security challenge to a polity such as that of Nigeria and elsewhere

The central thrust of this theory focuses on the way and manner in which people see themselves in terms of what tribe they belong to, what religion they practice and most importantly, what geo-political zone they come from. One of the most critical issues in all of these sentiments is the ideological leaning of members of one group over the

other. This increasing line of the social divide has been the bane of Nigerian social cohesion since the nation's independence in 1960. Interestingly, the argument is that the sustained postcolonial crisis expressed by groups over the years on how the nation should be structured to reflect diverse social interests is what has come to be manifested in form of Boko Haram terrorism or any other belligerent sects. In either case, the consequences can be very gracious, socially, economically and politically.

However, the notion of social identity theory was first systematically developed by scholars such as Tajfel and Turner. According to Tajfel and Turner (1985), the social identity theory is used to explain the psychological basis of intergroup discrimination in a society such as Nigeria. The theory purports that membership in social groups forms an essential aspect of a person's identity. To a large extent, most people tend to classify themselves and others into various social categories. The theory of social identity holds that a person has no one 'personal self', but rather 'several selves' that correspond to the increasing circles of a group membership. Thus, different social contexts may trigger an individual to think, feel and act based on his personal, familial or national levels of 'self'. The perception of social identity as being a subject matter of 'self' as propounded by Fajfel and Turner has been corroborated by most scholars such as Ashforth and Mael (1989); Agbiboa (2013). These latter scholars opined that the identity thesis manifests in three forms each of which is mutually reinforcing. Firstly, social identity is a perception of oneness with a group of people. Secondly, it involves the forming of in-groups and out-groups and, thirdly, social identity leads to activities that are congruent with the identity, support for institutions that embody the identity, and stereotypical perception of others and self. It also finds expression in outcomes that are traditionally associated with group formation such as one of the Boko Haram terrorist groups.

Relating the theory of this study to the paper, it can be unarguably eluded that aside from other social variables that constitute the Nigerian problems, religion is quite critical as a major pre-disposing factor bringing about Boko Haram terrorism. In Nigeria, for instance,

religion remains a powerful source of individual and social group identity. The choice of religion in the analysis of the linkages of social identity in Nigeria is in view of the relevance it has in Nigeria's national life.

OVERVIEW OF THE ATTACK ON KUJE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY IN ABUJA

Nigeria's rising insecurity reached new heights on Tuesday night 5th July 2022 as terrorists bombed Kuje prison, the nation's most fortified correctional centre. The country's most notorious terrorist suspects are being detained there. No fewer than 600 inmates were freed in the process; although authorities say about 300 escapees have now been captured. Nigeria's defence minister Bashir Magashi says all 64 inmates that have links to the Boko Haram Islamist rebel group are still on the loose. The incident happened barely hours after terrorists launched a daring attack on the advance security team of President Muhammadu Buhari, which had gone to Katsina State to make security arrangements ahead of the President's arrival for the Sallah celebration in his hometown of Daura. Two policemen were killed in the attack (The Africa Report, 2022).

Kuje, a town located on the outskirts of Abuja, the nation's capital, has witnessed a spike in violent attacks in recent months. A leaked government memo quoted Nigerian intelligence agencies as saying that terrorists from Nigeria's north-east and north-west had relocated to some parts of the outskirts of Abuja. Abuja had some nine years ago witnessed a series of terrorist attacks, including the bombing of the United Nations building, an attack on the police headquarters, a plaza and a military barracks. Information on impending riots or prison breaks is usually rolled out to the prison officials before the incidents occur, and a good number of these "breaks" are known to the authorities beforehand but they would never take any viable measure to forestall the phenomena (Jack, 2016).

However, these renewed attacks are now sparking fear in the minds of the millions of residents in the city, where nearly every embassy and government agency in Nigeria is headquartered.

President Buhari was elected in 2015 mainly on his credentials as a retired general with experience in tackling insecurity. However, while the activities of Boko Haram in the northeast have reduced considerably, other parts of the country are now experiencing unprecedented levels of violent attacks. No fewer than 14 prison breaks have occurred in the country in the past five years, with nearly 9,000 inmates released in the process and nearly half of them still on the run

Mike Ejiofor, a former director of the Department of State Services, Nigeria's intelligence agency, tells *The Africa Report* that the attacks are a big problem and pose a great challenge to security in Nigeria's capital. Ejiofor says it is curious that the attack on the prison comes amid a demand by terrorists for their colleagues to be released. "It is worrisome that we continue to record jail breaks despite efforts to fortify these facilities. These terrorists have been calling for the release of their colleagues. So, this attack may be connected. Everyone must now be on their toes and see what they can do because this portends danger for all of us if all these inmates are not immediately arrested (The Africa Report, 2022). The Kuje Prison in The Federal Capital Territory was bombed and attacked by terrorists; the Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) has claimed responsibility for the attack.

FACTORS THAT AIDED TERRORIST'S ATTACK ON KUJE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

There are three crucial reasons why Kuje was easily attacked

i. Kuje correctional centre is a medium size prison, with more suspects than convicts. Boko Haram suspects and other hardcore criminals awaiting trials since 2010.
ii. CCTV cameras, though installed, are non-functional. The Senate President, Sen Ahmed Lawan expressed dismay at none functioning of the CCTV cameras during his visit.
iii. There was also a failure of coordinated intelligence as revealed by President Buhari on his assessment tour of the facility before travelling out to Dakar for the Arica summit.

Kuje is surrounded by a thick forest that spans to Kaduna, casting suspicion of a possible link to the train attack in Kaduna on 5

March 2022. Again, after 100 days after the train attack in Kaduna, terrorists still operate in the forest. It is more disconcerting that currently, 64 hardened Boko Haram criminals escaped from the Kuje centre, now let loose in Abuja environs and other peripheral zones in the capital city. This attack could have been avoided and couldn't have been allowed to happen. It is also disheartening that no resistance during the attack, raising eyebrows that there was a likely insider connivance

PRISON INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND CYCLE

The intelligence process consists of a series of functions which, in their totality, validate and provide broader meaning to raw information. The functions in sequence are directing or tasking, collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, dissemination, and re-evaluation. This order of functions is usually referred to as the intelligence cycle, by which raw information is converted into useful intelligence that can be used for decision-making. Direct or task, collect, collate, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate (Innovative Prison System, 2020).

DIRECTING OR TASKING

The first phase of the intelligence cycle in a state involves tasking and giving directions. Intelligence analysis is driven by the needs of the end users of the analytical products, that is, the prison administration. The analytical effort is thus directed through directing by prison management, which takes the initiative at this stage of the cycle (Abiodun and Dahiru, 2020). Accordingly, directing (tasking) involves the formulation and prioritization of the prison administration's information needs; identifying and organizing personnel and resources; developing a collection plan; and assigning tasks to various prison operators and intelligence staff (UNODC, 2015).

The correctional service administration should have an overarching tasking and coordination process for intelligence gathering in all of its establishments. It should also appoint a senior officer to lead on security and intelligence matters (Trout, 2019). This officer needs to

create a sub-committee comprising the heads of each prison intelligence management board, with representatives from the police and probation service. It is this sub-committee that agrees on the security and intelligence strategic priorities for the department as a whole and individual establishment. The prisons security department needs to have some requirements on which to authorize their staff to collect and report intelligence on as follows: drug trafficking; organized gang-related activity; drug trafficking; escape planning; planned attacks on staff or other prisoners; illicit communications using mobile phone and internet; radicalization and violent extremist activity; bullying of vulnerable prisoners; and risks to safety and security, order and control of the prison respectively (Trout, 2019).

COLLECTION

Any intelligence process is only as good as the information that is collected. Also, information collection is the directed, focused gathering of information through overt and covert means, from all possible sources (Abiodun and Dahiru, 2020). These may include prison databases; court documents; information from staff, prisoners and third parties (e.g. law enforcement agencies); other prison units, e.g. security units, investigators and escort units; footage from cameras; the results of searches; the media and social networks; and any other source legally accessible to the intelligence unit. The importance of prison staff in information collection is paramount.

EVALUATION

Evaluation involves an assessment of the reliability of the source and the quality of the information. All information should be examined to evaluate the reliability of the source and the accuracy of the information (Abiodun and Dahiru, 2020). A specially trained member of prison staff should evaluate the information as it is received. A process should be in place to supervise and ensure quality information after submission. Feedback to the member of staff who gathered the information and to the evaluator is important if future evaluations are to improve (Trout, 2019).

COLLATION

Following evaluation in the process, all records and logs are received, either on paper or electronically, should be collated, filed, cross-referenced and ordered, ready for analysis. Collation involves the organization of the data collected into a format from which it can be retrieved and analyzed (Osifodunrin, 2013). However, collation requires examining all available information to quantify its contents and sorting similar information into logical groups, thereby converting raw information into formats that can be used by analysts and investigators. During collation, the prison system is required to carry out some groupings into People (both identifiable and not including their relationships to each other); Places (identified locations within the prison, yards, accommodation, and workshops among others); Things (telephone numbers, drugs, knives, escape equipment, home-made weapons, alcohol brewed in prison, among others) (Trout, 2019).

ANALYSIS

The analysis involves the careful examination of information to discover its meaning and essential features. The analysis stage of the intelligence process is a key one. Analysis can be described as an in-depth examination of the meaning and essential features of available information (Abiodun and Dahiru, 2020). The analysis highlights information gaps, strengths, and weaknesses and suggests a way forward. There are two basic categories of analysis: strategic analysis, which takes a higher "helicopter" and a longer-term perspective; and tactical analysis, which focuses on immediate, operational issues. Strategic information and intelligence consider trends and emerging threats (Rudy, 2019). In the same vein, tactical information and intelligence gaze at an existing situation or current operation, often in real-time. The analysis, therefore, considers information in perspective, draws conclusions as to what it means, highlights gaps in existing knowledge, suggests what is likely to happen next and makes recommendations as to possible future action (Abiodun and Dahiru, 2020).

GAINS OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN COMBATING TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

Although intelligence alone may not thwart a possible attack, it is fundamentally the primary step to the identification and prevention of an attack. There are two fundamental purposes served by intelligence gathering in the War on Terror: the primary one is informing policies and the secondary one is supporting military and or police operations that aim at guarding the country against terrorists and preventing their proliferation (Nte, 2011).

However, existing literature has made little effort to connect the dots on how these shapes, in particular, the intelligence operations framework in combating terrorism. This study will thus explore both the policy and logistics in intelligence pertaining to intelligence operations framework in combating terrorism. Literature broadly categorizes intelligence in the context of terrorism into two: strategic and tactical intelligence.

Strategic Intelligence: This pertains to the intelligence meant to inform long-term plans (Lowenthal, 2016). Through meticulous analysis and usage of computers for producing understandable estimations alongside succinct evaluations, law enforcers locally can get a basic instrument that may be used effectively in identifying possible terrorist activities and targets in society. This capacity to "predict" where and when terrorist attacks are likely to happen and the probable targets for the terrorists, by using intelligence, gives the local security agencies an upper hand in executing offensive and or defensive strategies to frustrate possible attacks (Hughbank & Githens, 2010).

Tactical Intelligence: This is intelligence whose use is mainly limited to operational units (Hughbank & Githens, 2010). Collection of this intelligence calls for skilled and committed ground officers, able to think fast and trace the very simple patterns in culture and changes in behaviour for those within their designated areas. Surprises and initiatives are only attained when there is effective tactical intelligence. Every potential assessed source needs to be used to its maximum potential inclusive of the ones often ignored. This calls for the establishment of a central clearing house for gathering and exploiting

the gathered information, then dispatching the collected intelligence to the commandants in charge, to pass on to an incoming shift or within the shift as considered appropriate. The ground officers are then required to relay the information obtained from their area of designation to their assigned intelligence collector within the required time. It is only in this manner that an intelligence system can operate at the requisite level for identifying and thwarting potential attacks (Hughbank & Githens, 2010). This will be investigated in this study to identify where there are failures that constitute the inability of intelligence to combat transnational terrorism.

The intelligence function is a critical component of any organization. However, within law enforcement agencies, the military and commercial business, intelligence and analysis are normally deployed by senior managers in the decision-making process. Intelligence helps to reduce uncertainty and to focus resources in the right areas (Innovative Prison System, 2020). To ensure that the correctional service authorities can identify these activities, all prison facilities should have in place a structured prison intelligence system to enable security and related information to be collected and evaluated in a very secure environment, consistent with national legislation, to meet security and intelligence objectives. All prison staff should have the responsibility to actively gather security information and pass this information to the security department (Australian Corrections Management, 2011)

EFFECT OF THE ATTACK ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

To aver that terrorism has far-reaching implications for national security is to state the obvious. This is an aphorism considering the devastating effects of terrorism in Nigeria recently. Aside from creating an ambience of desolation and displacement, it further exacerbates the spate of instability in such an area and threatens peaceful coexistence. As noted by Okoli and Iortyer (2014), the resultant public security volatility in the region has been an impediment to trade and investment, peaceful co-existence and stability, as well as sustainable livelihood and

development. In respect of the implications of terrorism for the wider polity of Nigeria, it is to be noted that the Boko Haram insurgency has led to a negative perception of Nigeria as an unsafe country by the wider world. This has damaged Nigeria's profile as a favourable international destination for investment, travel, tourism, scholarship, and migration. The implication of this is that Nigeria is gradually drifting into the status of an ostracized nation. This does not augur well for the sustenance of the country's national security.

Furthermore, the extent of violence and destruction that has been associated with the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has been horrific. The advent of suicide bombing as a strategy for prosecuting terrorism by members of the sect has since signalled a new dimension to the national security challenge in Nigeria. To say the least, the rising incidence and prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nigeria have exposed the country to serious levels of humanitarian and territorial vulnerabilities. In the face of this situation, the sustenance of Nigeria's national security is at best problematic. Aside from this, terrorism in Nigeria increases public insecurity, threatens livelihood, increases human right abuses, amplify population displacement and refugee debacle and swells human casualties/fatalities

To be sure, desiring development amidst terrorist attacks is illusory, as no real development can be attained in a war-prone society characterized by incessant bombings and attacks, considering that Nigerian democracy is nascent and can be easily disrupted by unrest. In agreement, Olademeji and Orensanwo (2014) report that the direct economic costs of terrorism including the destruction of lives and properly overbearing emergency responses, restoration and habitation are expensive. Furthermore, the costs of terrorism have slowed down Nigeria's infrastructural development as monies meant for developmental products are used to fight terrorism. Education and literacy are very important aspects of national security. Terrorist activities have led to the closure of schools as parents don't feel safe sending their wards to school; teachers are no longer available as they have fled their duty posts due to insecurity. School buildings are destroyed by bombs as infrastructure is on the decline, physiologically;

students are no longer in the mood as they are already disadvantaged educationally.

Direct Investment (FDI) towards the development of the Nigerian economy can never be over-emphasized. This is why Omenma (2019) opined that this is no gainsaying the fact that no man and by extension no state is an Island. This means that states need the relationship and partnership of one another to pursue development goals but the quest for foreign direct investment in Nigeria has been compromised by the level of insecurity in the country.

METHODOLOGY

This study uses the Expost-facto research design to unravel the gains of intelligence gathering in combating terrorism in Nigeria, especially the attack on the Kuje correctional facility in Abuja. Secondary and empirical data were obtained from published, unpublished and internet sources that address issues on terrorism and national security and the role of intelligence gathering. Content analysis was also adopted in analyzing the data gathered. The choice of this is based on the nature of the issue under study. According to Steve (2010), "content analysis enables researchers to sift through large volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion. It is also useful for examining trends and patterns of the phenomenon in literature".

CONCLUSION

This paper so far has pointed to the fact that one of the significant reasons behind the increasing jailbreaks in Nigeria is due to proliferation of firearms, economic and social crises, inadequate staffing of the correctional facilities and the fact that the Nigerian correctional system is deficient in the deployment of prison intelligence and dynamic security strategies that are supposed to conform with global practices. In addition, there is prison security failure as a result of corruption, poor leadership crisis, poor maintenance of facilities; gross abuse of prison rules, among others.

In the same vein, many inmates jailed for serious offences like armed robbery, kidnapping, murder, drug abuse, and terrorism, among

others, are not put under critical surveillance and the corrections officers in charge do not relate with them professionally in a manner that would make the inmates feel remorseful of criminal acts. And when all these come into play, the inmates make attempts to organize attacks on the prisons to escape or employ the assistance of their gangs outside the prison to free themselves. Sadly, many prison staff especially the arms squad unit have lost their lives trying to defend the prison facilities during the jailbreak. However, all these have besieged and continued to weaken the Nigerian Corrections Service operations and administration, therefore resulting in jailbreaks across Nigeria.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were made:

1. There should be an urgent deployment of modern security gadgets and support across the Correctional facilities in Nigeria because Intelligence support can be a valuable tool to assist law enforcement agencies in the performance of their daily duties. It's especially relevant in counterterrorism investigations and operations. Terrorist organizations rely heavily on secrecy and anonymity to carry out their religious and politically driven agendas, and intelligence gathering and exploitation is best suited to stripping away this critical layer of protection and making them more vulnerable to infiltration, investigation and arrest.
2. The Nigerian Correctional Service should also adopt the use of timely and actionable prison intelligence that would impact significantly on the prevention, reduction and investigation of serious and organized crime, particularly when it is transnational.
3. The existing Correctional Service Arms Squad should be more effective by adopting or using a multi-agency approach. The security of correctional facilities must collaborate with all other security agencies in the country to assist in the re-arrest of escaped prisoners.

4. There should be an effective restructuring of the prison training colleges and training manuals with an emphasis on integrity, prison intelligence and dynamic security
5. The existing Correctional Service Arms Squad should be more effective by adopting or using a multi-agency approach. The security of correctional facilities must collaborate with all other security agencies in the country to assist in intelligence gathering re-arrest of escaped prisoners.

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