SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, ELECTORAL VIOLENCE, AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA

Abioye Wasiu Olatunji[1]
Mbah Iyua[2]

Abstract
Since the resurgence of democracy in 1999, pre and post-election security skirmishes have been a fierce challenge to Nigeria's democratic consolidation. It is not deniable that the long-standing national election process has generally been characterized by violence. Because of the above, this paper considers security architecture, electoral violence, and democratic consolidation to identify the role of security agencies during elections in Nigeria and the causes of election violence. This paper identifies several areas of electoral violence, especially in the 2011, 2015, and 2019 general elections. Therefore, this study used secondary data collection, content analysis, and documentary techniques to examine the nature and characteristics of security in Nigerian elections, focusing on the role of security agencies in strengthening democracy. The study employed the social conflict theory as an analytical tool, and recommends, among other things, long-term surveillance and voter-centric strategies that will continue after general elections and that the government should develop strategies to support victims.

Keywords: Security, Election, Electoral Violence, Democracy, Democratic Consolidation

[1] Abioye Wasiu Olatunji is of the Department of Politics and Governance, Kwara State University Malete, tunji3015@yahoo.com
[2] Mbah Iyua is of the Department of Politics and Governance, Kwara State University Malete. iyuambah1983@gmail.com

Introduction

Nigeria returned to a democratic electoral process with its leaders chosen again in 1999 after extending military restrictions. This creates serious hope in the minds of many Nigerians that a return to democracy will accelerate development processes and put the country on the right track to the consolidation of democracy. To this end, Nigeria joined the great family of democracies following the death of General Sani Abacha. It is important to emphasize here that the death of General Sani Abacha reorient the country on the path of democracy.

In essence, states are no longer interested in interacting with undemocratic states. Democracy around the world has been seen as the foundation for positive development. It is therefore an undisputable fact that democracy has paved the way for self-landing development. The favorable social and environmental conditions created by democratic governments in societies are responsible for the socio-economic and political changes in these societies. The wave of democratization and political liberation around the world led to the growth of democracy in Africa. People understand that democracy will improve people's living conditions. Citizens believe that democracy is capable of delivering much-needed development in Africa.

Elections are an integral part of democracy without which it would be almost impossible. The election is a formal decision-making process in which people elect individuals to public office. This is the usual mechanism by which modern representative democracy operates. Such election is expected to be competitive, free, and fair both substantively and procedurally; and in which the capacity of elected officials to exercise decision-making is subordinated to the rule of law, and is often moderated by a constitution that emphasizes the protection of the rights and liberties of individuals while imposing constraints on leaders and to the extent that the will of the majority can be exercised against the rights of the minority.

Despite the legal framework that guides the electoral process, there is often a struggle between those who want to gain power and those who are likely to lose it. Since then, electoral violence has become the order of the day as attempts to seize power have intensified. Nigeria,

like any other majority federal state, is characterized by constant contention among the different individuals, groups, and ethnic groups that make up the federation. Since the start of democracy on May 29, 1999, electoral violence has increased at an alarming rate across the country.

As concurrent electoral violence has been the scourge of the democratic transition in Nigeria, a mechanism needs to be established to limit the threat. It should be noted that, historically, violence has been a major feature of political life worldwide. It's just that political violence varies in intensity, tendency, and dimension from one political system to another. Comparative political scientists agree that since time immemorial, violence has been a recurring phenomenon in human societies around the world, and in particular, today's world is awash with violence. Ayeniakeke, 2008).

Given that electoral violence can be used by both ruling and opposition forces, as well as the many possible targets enacted above, electoral violence is certainly a source of instability (Omotola, 2010). Thus, the country's security architecture has become an integral part of electoral processes to ensure that the selection of the country's leader is held peacefully and non-violently. Despite the foregoing fact that security is deeply involved in this process, elections in Nigeria are still turbulent and thus characterized by violence that slows down the space for democratic consolidation in the country. It is in this context that this work seeks to analyze the role of security in the fight against electoral violence in Nigeria which will transcend into democratic consolidation.

Conceptual Issues

Democratic Consolidation

Democracy as a concept from time immemorial has gone through different stages as scholars and practitioners continue to view it differently. As a result, scholars, policy analysts, and researchers have sought to harmonize and interpret democracy that reflects their understanding of the concept. Democracy as seen by Webster (1828) in the classical period is a popular government, for the people, made by the people, and accountable to the people. Democracy refers to

everyone's participation in decision-making as it was practiced in ancient Greece. This requires that all interests be equally represented. However, over the years there has been a gradual shift from the traditional view of democracy to the modern view of the concept.

In modern times, democracy is the representative government of the masses. To this extent, democracy largely depends on the participation of the people. Therefore, it is required that people's participation in decision-making to select representatives be moderate, law-abiding, and tolerant of the differing views of other groups and individuals (Ake, 1996, Toyo, 1994). According to this perspective, democracy and, generally speaking, a system of administration by law, not by individuals, have become more and more dependent on the rule of law. The rule of law safeguards citizen rights upholds stability and places boundaries on governmental power in a democratic system of government. Everyone is equal before the law in the end. Suffice it to say that representative democracy in its modern context can be seen as universal participation through a process of free, fair, and reliable elections that are periodic and legally valid.

The consolidation of democracy, as Diamond (1997) has advanced, is a process by which democracy is so well established and legitimized that it cannot be overthrown or destroyed. Attribution to the above, Obi (2003:255) asserts that in terms of strengthening democratic institutions, the ascendancy of a democratic culture is complemented by a change of attitude from authoritarian to democratic. Obi further asserts that this presupposes the openness of the democratic process, the supremacy of the rule of law, and civic engagement with the democratic state. Perhaps, due to the special contribution of ideological democracy to national cohesion and political stability.

Considering the central role of elections in consolidating democracy and enhancing political legitimacy, other schools of thought have emphasized the imperative of the "two-round electoral rule" to identify the foundation of democracy. This places more emphasis on the situation where the winners of particular elections appear freely and fairly. Central to democracy is consolidated when an elected outgoing

government voluntarily cedes power after the election and the same elected government cedes power to another group of elected leaders.

Electoral violence

Election violence has no one description, and there is no approved jargon for discussing it. Alston (2010) noted that the primary definitions and methods of electoral violence are mostly built on the goal of influencing the election. According to Höglund (2009) "the time and motivation of electoral violence are what distinguish it from other types of political violence. The temporal component has to do with election-related violence. Election-related violence aims to affect the voting process and, by extension, the results. In a similar view, Laakso (2007) asserted that electoral violence is an activity motivated by an attempt to impact the results of the elections - either by influencing the electoral processes and participation or by disputing the legitimacy of the polls.

Electoral violence is a method of restricting and/or repressing a person's or group's right to participate in political institutions and processes through the use of coercion or pressure, as well as physical and sexual harm, according to Bardal (2016), who offers the right-based definition. It may occur in the family, the larger community, online, through the media, or it may be committed or tolerated by the state. It may also occur in public or in private. Alston (2010) notes that some electoral killings in particular killings during riots or protests are not motivated by an intention to influence an election, even though "much election-related violence is indeed motivated by a desire to influence the conduct or outcome of an election in some way." While some protests may be made to influence or change political outcomes, others may be made out of outrage, rage, or disappointment at a particular conclusion and are not necessarily made to change that outcome:

Security Architecture

The concept of security architecture depicts an architectural design that takes into account all potential risks and dangers that can be present in the environment or that specific scenario. The application of security controls is also covered by this. The appropriate paperwork is

completed for the security architecture, which contains all the security requirements as well as comprehensive details on the architecture**.** Security Architecture is a unified security design that addresses the needs and potential risks associated with a given scenario or environment. It also specifies when and where to apply security checks. The design process is often repeatable. In security architecture, design principles are reported and in-depth security control specifications are often documented in independent documents.

Theoretical Framework

There are several theories in social sciences with useful explanations of social phenomena, however, for this study, the theory of social conflict will serve as a valuable tool in this regard. The theory of social conflict derives from the ideas of Karl Marx, who believed that society is a dynamic, constantly evolving entity fueled by class conflict (Marx, 1848). According to the social conflict theorist, society is made up of individuals competing for limited and scarce resources. Competition for scarce resources is at the heart of all social relations. Thus, competition, rather than consensus, characterizes human relationships.

Social structures and broader institutions (e.g., religion, government, etc.) reflect the competition for resources and the inequalities inherent in competition; some people and organizations have more power and influence and thus use their resources to maintain their position of power in society. Through different forms of conflict, groups will tend to obtain different amounts of material resources. Thus, the most powerful groups of individuals in society tend to use their power, including violence, to stay in power and continue to enjoy their economic power. The powerful group will try to maintain its privilege, power, status, and social position and will therefore try to influence politics, education, and other institutions to protect and limit access to forms of capital and their resources.

Electoral Violence In Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Nigeria officially returned to democracy on May 29, 1999. During the election that ushered in a new democracy, election-related violence was

recorded, but not as widespread as some feared. The Carter Center and the National Institute for Democracy, which jointly observed the 1999 elections, reported that "the transition from military to civilian rule has generally occurred without violence, reserved harsher criticism of electoral irregularities and outright fraud (NDI, 2000, Carter Center, 2000).

The 2003 general election that followed the 1999 general election recorded high levels of violence in the country. Electoral violence in the 2003 election cycle was more blatant and widespread. Violence has been documented from partisan clashes, political assassinations, and community unrest in already unstable and fragile areas such as the Niger Delta, an oil producer in Nigeria. This cycle also marked the uncontrolled rise of another disturbing development; the hiring and equipping of militias for narrow political purposes. Action for Environmental Rights (2003) tasked with monitoring the elections called them "a low-intensity armed struggle. Politicians and party leaders have found a supply of unemployed youth willing to commit acts of violence in exchange for wages and offensive force (American Institute of Peace, Aug. 2009, HRW, 2003). As a result, these young men represented a significant percentage of those killed before the 2003 survey (HRW, 2003).

The 2007 general elections were even worse than the 1999 and 2003 general elections respectively. It also influenced the decision of former President Umaru Yar`Adua, who publicly acknowledged that the election that brought him to power in 2007 was characterized by a high degree of irregularities and electoral defeat. One worrying aspect of the violence occurring during the election process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic is the increasing rate of assassinations of political opponents and the perceived "political obstacles" to the electoral victory of certain individuals. The 2007 elections saw the same patterns of violence and intimidation as previous elections. 2007 electoral violence became such a credible risk despite the return of democracy in Nigeria that the mere threat of it was enough to keep many voters away from the ballot box, such as in Rivers State, where ballot papers and threats of violence contribute to low voter turnout.

In particular, the despicable and compromising behaviors of security agents during the 2003 and 2007 elections, especially in rural polling stations, were unprecedented in the electoral history of this country. There have been several reported cases of multiple thumbprints, ballot stuffing, and various other forms of misconduct by election and security officials (Olutola, 2019). In addition, the wave of violence observed during the 2003, 2007, and 2011 general elections was unprecedented. The election can be described as a battle in which there is a freedom-for-all fight between the ruling party (PDP) and other opposition parties. They all used armed scissors to perpetuate the violence, and many voters were denied their rights as a result of electoral violence. For example, Environmental Rights Action, one of the recognized election observers during the election, observed that in parts of the states of Rivers and Bayelsa their observer's observer, the election can be seen as a low-intensity armed struggle. Firearms and firearms of various types and sophistication were freely used (Action for Environmental Rights, 2003). As a result of the massive fraud and violence that took place in the 2003 and 2007 general elections, the Nigerian people were outraged and as a result, they began to lose interest.

In this regard, Action Aid Nigeria has published a report on the violence that characterized the 2003 and 2007 general elections in the country. Reports classified electoral violence in Nigeria as protracted social conflict, "characterized by civil unrest, increased social and political tensions and sporadic use of violence, but in which armed conflict was not officially declared (ActionAid, 2010). Before the 2011 general election, political violence had occurred in several states. For example, in Edo State, a political candidate was shot dead in August after announcing his intention to run for a seat in the House of Representatives (Ojo & Ademowo, 2015, Next, August 10, 2010). A security aide to the former governor of Bauchi state was shot in what could be an attack on the governor himself, an incident that follows several other attacks involving politicians from Bauchi or their affiliates. George, a prominent Niger Delta activist accused of election fraud, was killed in Rivers State (27th September 2007), while supporters of the two

then gubernatorial candidates met in Kano, leaving one dead and several injured (Daily Trust, 13th, September 2010).

In comparison, the 2011 and 2015 elections show stark differences in the depth, form, and degree of violence. In addition to pre-election skirmishes in various geopolitical regions, post-election violence in the 2011 election left more than 800 people dead and more than 65,000 displaced during three days of riots in 12 northern states (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Authors such as Bamgbose (2011) and Orji and Uzodi (2012) link violence to factors such as division of the country by ethnic and religious lines, rising political ambitions and tensions, and socioeconomic deprivation, including unemployment and illiteracy, and poor crisis management by the state, capacity, offensive rhetoric, community tension, and an over-monetized election process.

Finally, the much-anticipated 2015 general election took place amid numerous security concerns, particularly the growing wave of Boko Haram insurgency in the country. Security presence in polling stations was very active, unlike previous elections in Nigeria (punch on April 29, 2015). The behavior of security agents during the 2019 election was generally considered mature and professional. Indeed, to a large extent, a clear departure from the past can be seen in the behavior of security officers during the 2019 general election.

But despite these noteworthy and admirable accomplishments, there were numerous security officers in many areas of the country during the 2015 and 2019 elections, and some omissions, irregularities, and misconduct were also attributed to some security personnel before, during, and after the election (Olutola; 2019). For instance, a study from the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) on March 29, 2015, claims that during the year's Presidential elections, there were incidents of radical security agents intimidating and harassing voters in the canton of Sokoto (CDD, 2015).

Similar to what happened in Rivers State, security agents have also been duly charged on the basis that no one has been brought to justice by the agency despite irrefutable evidence at the time of the vote. underage voting, as some national dailies in Kogi and Bauchi states,

reported during the 2015 General Election (This Date, July 28, 2015). However, the 2015 and 2019 elections were less many violent, but some 'incidents have been recorded mainly in the south-south. These include Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, and Bayelsa as well as other states such as Ondo, Ebonyi, Lagos, Kaduna, Jigawa, Enugu, Ekiti, Katsina, Plateau, Kogi, Abia, Imo, Kano and Ogun (Muheeb, 2016).

Democratic Consolidation And Patterns Of Electoral Violence In Nigeria

The pre-election segment includes sports that could either have a short-term or long-term impact on the likelihood of an electoral conflict. Empirical research has demonstrated that pre-election electoral violence frequently appears at both the intra- and inter-party levels in matters such as the formation of parties, the undemocratic internal organization of party primaries and the fielding of candidates for elected positions, government sponsorship of a particular party, manipulation using party insiders, an excessive godfather effect on party proceedings, zoning issues, the loss of distinct ideologies, and more (Ojo & Ademowo, 2015:89, Abutudu and Obakhedo, 2009).

Electoral violence consists of the dearth of safety in polling posts, partisan disposition of safety agencies, abuse of duties with the aid of using safety personnel, INEC officers and the media, winner takes all syndrome, which makes the political contest a counted amount of existence and death, logistic failure on the part of the electoral bodies, which initiate electoral violence and so on. It is likewise substantial in Nigeria the outbreak of violence after the declaration of election results. This is expressed, among other things, in terms of the president suppressing unsuccessful candidates, falsifying results and announcing them through INEC, marginalizing regions run by rival parties, judiciary compromise, and unfavorable handling of election petitions. There is adequate proof in Nigeria's political history that the failure of successive governments to create facilitative political surroundings for the safety of elections become critical to the fall apart of the Old Republics.

Before searching for the reasons for unique conflicts through the 2011 election season, it has to be referred to as election-associated. Violence manifests itself in a predictable sample at some stage in Nigeria. Election disputes can commonly be divided into 4 associated categories. Conflicts inside political parties, clashes among political parties, election violence, and communal unrest.

Intra-party feud voting violence on the stage happens most usually earlier than party primaries, and its depth is correlated with the party-political effect. As a few analysts argue, "if one party is in strength, the war inside that party tends to be greater (Abayomi, 2013). At the country-wide stage and in lots of Nigeria's 36 states, the People's Democratic Party become the ruling party. The place of PDP tickets all through this era ensured election victory in lots of elements of Nigeria. From the national legislature to the governor, opposition to PDP nominations is regularly related to violent battles (Obe, 2010). The ordinary electorate is not often at once concerned with this sort of violence. A fighter with the aid of using elite-subsidized militias or the elite themselves, as in July 2006, PDP candidate Lagos Funsho Williams become killed at his domestic with the aid of using an employed bomber. It is directed in opposition to.

Clashes Among Political Parties

This sort of violence commonly happens at any factor within the election cycle, however maximum commonly, all through the post-election periods, elections in opposition to applicants are fraudulent. Opposition to party supporters who accept as true with they've been. Very appropriate examples of this have been the 2011 post-election violence in northern Nigeria, particularly in Kaduna and Kano. The voice there has been minimal. The loss of ballots and the closure of balloting cubicles have been extreme elements of the problem, as have the threats to the electorate. However, the number of votes nationally reached millions, inflicting superb anger. In this case, post-election strength tended to grow instead of decrease. As Human Rights Watch pointed out, the violence in Rivers State has become "now no longer an unintentional explosion," and in fact, possibly now no longer only a

reaction to neighborhood events, "a fraudulent and violent nation affair in April 2007. It became an extensively expected aftermath of the election" (HRW, 2003, 2008).

The sample of election violence follows an almost predictable order earlier than and after the most important election events. Party primaries and election days are extreme concerns, however, even the primary election of party representatives may be controversial (Hazen and Horner, 2007; Abayomi, 2013). This, mixed with the headline stress that present-day INEC managers are beneath to nicely manipulate voter registration, and the uncertainty surrounding the very last day of the 2019 election, has created a wide ecosystem of horror.

Past elections have proven that the nearer polls are, the more likely it's far that violence will occur, and that the whole election month is a high-threat period, as proven within the preceding elections. This is the case, for example, while the incumbent Governor of Edo pronounces struggle fare at the competition in the recent Governor's election. Most importantly, the declaration of election results, recognized to be fraudulent and unethical in democracy, ignited Katsina's authorities' construction with the reputedly not likely information that "PDP has been wiped out." As pronounced inside the case of the competition electorate, the "nation of the governor's election" brought about a violent reaction.

Regional Anxiety

Election tensions aggravate ongoing network disputes in Nigeria, which may include rivalries over nearby aid, rebellious strain in response to corrupt and degenerate leadership, and/or ethnic and spiritual animosity. Two areas of the unique situation are the plateau state within the northern part of the country and the Niger Delta in southern Nigeria, together with Borno. In Anambra, a few regular newspapers name it the "unsightly past" of election violence and fraud. Almost ordinary threats of poll field polling, poll field theft, kidnapping, and different safety breaches. However, the February 2007 Governor's election campaign is widely regarded as a "test case" for the

2011 general election, suggesting that a better election could be more peaceful (Amuchie, 2010).

The Niger Delta has long been a source of concern. President Yaradua prioritized peace in oil-rich areas in 2009, and his government provided Delta fighters with a memory loss package that included education and training in exchange for surrender and, in some cases, weapons surrender (Ajunwa, 2010). Tragically, protracted concerns seemed too foreseen when the car bomb exploded during the celebration of Abuja Independence Day on October 1, 2010.

Security Architecture And Electoral Violence In Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Globally, elections can be conducted in an atmosphere of peace and harmless movement in which voters participating in the democratic process accept or reject the offer of candidates who want to direct the work of a particular public office. In this regard, Olutola (2019) argued that election is a process that was harmless in many countries by striving for the insatiable nature and power, status, influence, and wealth of human beings. It is discovered that it turned into a full-scale battle between physical powers. He also reaffirms the need for true, targeted, and rewarding election security, with the constant election irregularities and associated violence that often characterize elections in many young democracies.

Nigeria's election security has been the subject of academic debate and publications, especially since the introduction of the multi-party system in 1999. Some reviews of scholarly research in this area exaggerate the importance of security agencies functioning effectively and efficiently in conducting free, fair, and credible elections in any democratic environment. Jinadu (2011) clearly states that election security goes beyond elections and other activities that take place only on election days. The presence of security guards during elections was described as the "intentional prevention of election administration distortions, violations, and manipulations." This is to ensure the legitimacy of democratic elections and democratic political inheritance (Olutola, 2019).

Security agencies, recruited voters, participants in political rallies and campaigns, general election materials, election staff, observers, party members, and other interested parties were specifically tasked with gathering information before and on the day of the election in Nigeria for the general elections in 2015 and 2019. Closely related to the above is to ensure a free, fair, secure, and legitimate campaign atmosphere for all parties without discriminating against parties or candidates near polling stations or collation centers. It is the contribution of the guards. Security agencies have not been encouraged to participate in elections for years. This is a prerequisite for the lack of interoperability between security agencies due to the satisfaction of the security agencies (Fayam, 2008). Security architecture is widely recognized in elections, but there are some restrictions as most securities are bribed by politicians and prevent program coordination (Schlozman & Verba 1987).

This influences the public decision to blame security agents for working to improve the interests of certain strong individuals. Many say, "Security forces are subject to strict instructions and directives in performing their duties during elections. Many actors and politicians use all methods, including the guidance of both voters and security forces. And see the election as a “do” or "die" case. For example, in the 2015 elections, people received money, but many grew up on their own and chose their favorite candidates. Security agencies have played an important role in protecting election materials and participants during elections, but due to the injustice of those in authority, almost all participants and the entire election are manipulated. Securities do not play an important role in protecting the lives and property of voters, especially the opposition and its members. Most election studies show that security forces support the government in power rather than law and order.

As a result, security agencies are considered to be promoting election injustice, thereby incentivizing already angry opponents and supporters, and motivating them to use violence. Nevertheless, as an irreducible feature of democratic governance, elections can sow the seeds of good governance if properly managed. Deepening

accountability, social justice, the rule of law, gender equality and quality leadership are the links and tubes for a progressive society.

Electoral Violence And Democratic Consolidation In Nigeria: The Way Forward

Elections are a fundamental element of democracy. It takes advantage of the opportunity for a transparent change of power and the distribution of power in society. In this regard, democratization as a means of sustaining peace between international politics and decision-makers has played a major role for decades. The claim to support peace-building in the context of democratization arose as a result of the recognition that political repression and discrimination were often the real motives the group first addressed. To this end, democratization not only creates opportunities and manifestations of political rights but also sees them as the answer to addressing the actual causes of conflict.

Elections and democracy have become indispensable methods and strategies for peace-building interwoven with violence. Beyond the 2019 general elections, peace-building officials, civil society organizations, and other development partners, the private sector, violence prevention management, and management of elections should use mediation technology for future elections in Nigeria. Teaching this constructive peace-building initiative will overthrow the conflict suppression system and enrich voters with decisions and politics to reduce tensions, maliciousness, and resentment among political parties, politicians, and political supporters. To change the story of our democratic adventures, citizens must also show their unabashed desire to challenge the split forces that fight the election sequence.

First, don't forget the victims of violence.

Whether or not violence is a political motivation, depends on where you were at the time of the violence and how you are affected. Some controversy may follow based on election violence. But if people believe that violence is a political motivation, it has a political impact. When politicians and political activists are victims of violence, certain political campaigns may not reach all constituencies or all parts of the country.

This limits the right to freedom of information and impedes free political choice. Targeting voters during registration or before and after elections may prevent citizens from voting or voting for a particular political party due to fear rather than free choice.

It is the Government's responsibility to develop strategies to support victims of electoral violence, essential for the development of a well-functioning democratic society and lasting peace. Election violence prevention and management strategies focus primarily on perpetrators, and the perspective of victims of such violence is often ignored. A general approach to helping victims of violence is important so that affected people can cope with the consequences of violence. In some circles, politicians have always been potential targets of political violence. Citizens may generally feel compelled to openly and freely express their political views, participate in public debates, and organize politically. The consequences of such a dangerous environment include restrictions on political rights and the difficulty of making politicians accountable.

Election violence needs to be dealt with continuously

Traditionally, the focus has been on national and general elections. For example, election violence surveillance and civil as well as party education programs focus on the time before such elections. However, by-elections can be more vulnerable to violence than general elections, and violence can occur between elections. Therefore, to seriously prevent and address the causes and consequences of violence, policies to combat electoral violence, especially surveillance and voter-centric strategies, need to be implemented over time between parliamentary elections.

Institutional arrangements including a legal framework and electoral system in this regard create incentives and barriers to electoral violence

Some regulations have a particularly high stake in elections. For example, in a majority election in a constituency with only one member, the importance of certain people increases the risk of being a victim of

violence. By-election arrangements can shift the balance of power, increase stakes, and put certain individuals at risk of intimidation and violence. This is typical of the upcoming governorship elections in Osun State. The Election Act can regulate the use of force and authority of the Election Commission, and legal restrictions on election candidacy. Such laws can also establish a code of conduct for elections. This may include agreements to avoid hate speech and other activities that may promote violence or polarization. In particular, due to high levels of distrust and uncertainty in the country and during elections, it may be necessary to increase the placement of security guards. International peacekeepers and observers can act as external guarantors if their national security capabilities are low or even part of violence by national security forces. In other cases, Home Office police can play an important role in preventing election violence in the short and long term.

Long-term security measures are very important to security forces in terms of deterrence and their police capabilities.

Without the enforcement of election law, legal restrictions on the use of force in elections would be useless. This is especially possible in countries such as Nigeria where the culture of conflict is constant and impunity is high. The use of short-term security enhancements is essential, especially in high-voltage areas, to directly prevent the use of force in elections.

Conclusion

The empirical impact of electoral violence on the electoral system and democratic integration is plentiful. This ugly tendency is fundamental to the Nigerian state's ability and ability to curb election violence and fraud, as security agencies fail to meet their constitutional obligations with the eerie violence dance that shaped the history of national elections. Indeed, the nature and character of the country's election-related violence and manipulation pose a serious threat to the national pursuit of democratic consolidation and national development (Malu, 2009). Nigeria's main concern and electoral violence as a problem have disrupted the entire bloodstream of our political system and permeated

its impact on national development. For Nigeria to achieve democratic consolidation as a nation, political parties, politicians, supporters, and voters must deviate from and avoid all forms of electoral violence.

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