NIGERIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE AFRICA UNION'S (AU) PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN SOMALIA, 2010 – 2019

Agaba Halidu [1]
Andrew Lazarus[2]
Kolapo, Tola Raimi Lawal[3]
Ohikhokhai Ben Williams[4]

Abstract
The work examined the contribution of Nigeria in the Somalia peacekeeping operations under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It utilized both primary and secondary methods to collect data. As a framework of analysis, the research adopted the functionalist theory. From the findings of the research, it was discovered that the conflict in Somalia was caused by the legacy of colonialism, clannism, corruption, and competition for economic resources which informed the intervention of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping operations. Examining the role of Nigeria, findings revealed that Nigeria contributed significantly to the peace process in Somalia. These were in the areas of protecting civilians, providing humanitarian assistance, and providing an enabling environment for negotiation, among others.

[1] Agaba Halidu is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Abuja, Nigeria.
[2] Andrew Lazarus is with the Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Abuja, Nigeria.
[3] Kolapo, Tola Raimi Lawal is with the Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Abuja, Nigeria
[4]Ben, Williams Ohikhokhai is with the Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Abuja, Nigeria

These, however, were not without challenges, including lack of staff and resources, financial, and logistical constraints. The research, therefore, recommends that certain measures should be taken to address these challenges. These measures are proper training and retraining of Nigerian officials on peacekeeping with modern equipment, sincerity on the part of the Nigerian government in procuring modern equipment, and eschewing corruption.

Keywords: *Africa, Contribution, Nigeria, Peacekeeping, Operation, Somalia*

Introduction

Somalia, a country in the Horn of Africa, is among the world's most volatile and conflict-ridden countries. The country continues to be the value of most of the intense inters - states and intra- state conflicts in post-colonial Africa. More so because of its geographical proximity to the Middle East and strategic significance, it has gained the attention of international powers since antiquity. Somalia achieved its independence on July 1, 1960, and has been described as the only homogenous society in Africa that speaks a single language and adheres to one religion which is Islam (The World Bank, Encyclopaedia,2003).

To be sure, Somalia has been lacking a functioning state since the overthrow of the military government, led by General Siyad Bare, in 1991 by clan-based rebel factions, spearheaded by warlords and politicians and consequently, the country's decades of protracted civil war started. The violence and conflict situation in Somalia is best captured by Kaburu (2018) when he argued that Somalia lacked an effective functional government for decades. And that continued anarchy and protracted violence have not only led to human suffering and misery among the Somali citizenry but have spillover effects regionally and globally. As a result of this violence, thousands of refugees have fled into the neighboring state; the proliferation of small arms remains rampant, and most recently, the scourge of international

terrorism and piracy off the coast of Somalia has undermined efforts toward the political restoration of the state of Somalia. With this reality of more than two decades of conflict, Somalia has been held up as the most obvious example of a failed state(Elmi,2006).

Several efforts from different dimensions have been put in place to resolve the conflict. Among these efforts is that of the Inter-Governmental Authority of Development(IGADD). IGAD is a product of the restructured Intern-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification(IGADD). IGAD with a broadened mandate, which includes conflict management, established a Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. Although internationally recognized, TFG failed to attract legitimacy among the contending factions in Somalia

The failure of the IGAD to restore peace in Somalia led to the intervention of the African Union with an operation peacekeeping code name- the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) through the AU Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007. AMISOM had the mandate to stabilize the situation to create conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an immediate takeover by the United Nations. Over the years, the mandate has been expanded. Today the main tasks of the AMISOM are to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other arms opposition groups, support FGS in expanding the control of national territory and assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia (Mohammed,2014). Interestingly, Nigeria contributed both human and material resources to AMISOM as a member of the AU

The contribution of Nigeria to International Peacekeeping Operations, especially under the AU cannot be overemphasized. Since her independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has become a prominent actor in the international system. By all standards, the country is

committed to regional peace and global security, and it was through the African Union Mission to Somalia, popularly called AMISON. Nigeria is argued to have contributed and played a vital role in the peacekeeping operations of the African Union in Somalia (AMISOM). The objective of this work, therefore, is to examine the efforts made by Nigeria under the platform of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) toward the resolution of the Somalia conflict. However, the specific objectives are to:

i. find out the causes of the conflict in Somalia
ii. analyze the impact of the African Union in the resolution to resolve the Somalia conflict
iii. identify the leadership role Nigeria played in the resolution of the Somalia conflict
iv. unravel the challenges faced by Nigeria in the resolution of the Somalia Conflict

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

i. The Concept Conflict

Conflict is said to exist when two or more groups engage in a struggle over values and claims to status, power, and resources in which the opponent aims to neutralize, injure or eliminate the rivals (Jeong, 2000). Conflict is a demonstration of cross-purposes of distinct or similar political groups, often ending in political violence when contextualized in the Weberian sense.

Suberu (2005) viewed conflicts as the unresolved contradictions and challenges in promoting the equitable and peaceable distribution of public opportunities and resources among ethnically or religiously defined elites and constituencies in a context of horizontal disparity and relative economic scarcity.

In general literature, conflict is interchangeably used with other terms like contrast, disharmony, discord, struggle, contest, strife,

antagonism, controversy, clash, rivalry, contest, contention, brawl, fisticuff, fight, battle, feud, combat and war.

ii. The Concept of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping involves the deployment of military or police, and frequently civilian personnel to assist in implementing agreements reached between governments or parties engaged in conflict. To be sure peacekeeping presumes cooperation and its method are inherently peaceful. Agwu (2007) indicated that peacekeeping consists essentially of observer missions and lightly armed forces monitoring ceasefires, operating in an essentially static mode with the consent of the parties involved. In its traditional sense, peacekeeping meant conflict containment and it adopted the form of neutral outside assistance to mediate and encourage belligerent parties to disengage (Dokubo, 2005: 253). Peacekeeping in this context is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. Hence peacekeeping as a third contingency approach to conflict management, according to Bassey is "one of the novel techniques" of "Conflict Diplomacy" which has gained wide currency in the contemporary international era (Agaba and Adeniji, 2018).

iii. Peace Support Operation

The term Peace Support Operation (PSO) according to Simanidis (2007)) is an organized international assistance initiative to support the maintenance, monitoring, and building of peace and the prevention of resurgent violent conflict. There are two categories of POs: peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peace operations monitor and support the establishment of peace, usually in the context of a peace agreement, and enforce and operations create conditions for peace and are permitted to use force.

The idea behind peace support, according to Sriram (2011) is not particularly revolutionary. In essence, a peace support mission is designed to undertake a range of civilian and military tasks, including the maintenance of public order, policing, monitoring of the security

forces, infrastructure reconstruction and national reconciliation. The peace support model operates based on flexibility, allowing the mission to adapt its posture between peacekeeping and peace enforcement depending on the compliance of the parties. The first goal of peace support is the achievement of negative peace. To achieve this, the use of force must be monopolized by legitimate actors. In an ideal world, democratically accountable and effective state security forces will monopolize the use of force and uphold the rule of law. However, the reality is that state security forces are often uncountable and ineffective.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Functionalist theory was adopted as a framework of analysis for this study. The theory was espoused by David Mitrany, Donald Puchala, Karl DeAmitai Etzioni, Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, and others. The basic theoretical proposition of the functionalist approach is that all system exists to perform functions through their structure. Society consists of numerous interrelated parts, in which each of the elements in the society performs a specific function whose basic goal is the maintenance of the systemic equilibrium.

The social system's dominant tendency is towards stability maintained by its in-building mechanism. The functionalists emphasize more on the technical or functional collaboration cutting across national frontiers and the challenges of the democratic political institutions as a result of the growing complexity of the task facing them. The functional activity could re-orient international activity and contribute to world peace. It is linked to the conceptualization of global politics based upon a growing level of interdependence among actors whose interests and activities are not coincidental with state frontiers (Atama, 2003).

An aspect of functionalism according to Donald Puchala, is regional integration. He sees integration "as a set of processes that produces a system at the international level, i.e. an international system wherein actors find it possible consistently to harmonize their interests, compromise their differences and real mutual rewards from their integration. Functionalism addresses society as a whole in terms of the

function of its constituent elements; namely norms, customs, traditions, and constitutions. A common analogy popularized by Herbert Spencer presents these parts of society as "organs" that work toward the proper functioning of the "body" as a whole (Beardsworth and Keil,2002).

Emile Durkheim was concerned with the question of how certain societies maintain internal stability and survive over time. He proposes that such societies tend to be segmented, with equivalent parts held together by shared values and common symbols. In modern complex societies, members perform very different tasks, resulting in strong interdependence. Societies are held together by organic solidarity, i.e. "social bonds, based on specialization and interdependence, thus making society function as the human body. Just as the structural parts of the human body-the skeleton, muscles, are various internal organs, that function independently to help the entire organism survive, social structures work together to preserve society. For example, judicial systems help maintain order, and schools teach children. A problem in a single part of society can disrupt the whole. Therefore, social structures work together to preserve society as each part serves a particular purpose. Therefore, one of the key ideas in functionalism is that society is made up of groups or institutions, which are cohesive, share common norms, and have a definitive culture.

Functionalists believe institutions come about and persist because they play a function in society, promoting stability and integration. Functionalists analyse social institutions in terms of the functions they play. In other words, to understand a component of society, one must ask, "What are the functions of this institution? How does it contribute to social stability? Functionalists emphasize that order and balance are the normal states of society and a disruption in one part of the system will certainly disrupt other parts. Functionalism is considered vital for the smooth-running of society because to maintain a peaceful society, each institution in a country must play its function; essentially because failure to do so will lead to the outbreak of conflicts.

Afro-centrism is one of the cardinal foreign policy principles of Nigeria's foreign policy. This very foreign policy principle makes the country prioritize Africa in decision-making as regards foreign policy. This very foreign policy principle guides the foreign policy decision-makers in the country and this has led to so many interventions in so many African countries that have been engulfed in crises ranging from civil war, to terrorism and the like. This very foreign policy principle has made Nigeria intervene in the Liberian crisis, Gambia, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone and to be specific, Somalia which is the subject matter of this work.

The functionalist theory was adopted because the formation of the AU was basically to ensure a stable and well-ordered society which enhances the realization of the motives of the founding fathers. In addition, AU abhors change which it sees as causing disequilibrium as it sees any contrary view or action against its ideas as actions that will disrupt its co-existence to maintain and ensure its peace and security. And the Afro-centric foreign policy principle of Nigeria made the country lead the AMISOM mission in Somalia under the platform of the African Union (AU). Nigeria intervened in the crises and led African Union troops to Somalia to ensure a stable and well-ordered society which will enhance the realization of the formation of the African Union. The country has the largest economy and participates actively in the African Union because of its resources. The country is blessed with human and material resources that gave it an edge to take the lead in the AMISOM peacekeeping operation in Somalia. Nigeria having the largest economy demonstrates her leadership role in Somalia's peacekeeping operations under the umbrella of AMISOM which aims at resolving conflict and maintaining peace and security in Somalia, and also to maintain a state of balanced and social equilibrium for the whole.

METHODOLOGY

i. Research Design

This study used a survey design method to asses **Nigeria's Contribution to the African Union's (AU) Peacekeeping Operations**

in Somalia Conflict from 2010 to s2019. Survey design is the method used to describe the characteristics of the population or phenomenon that is being studied.

ii. Target Population

This study was conducted in four Ministries in Abuja Federal Capital of Nigeria, which are Nigeria Federal Ministry of Defence with a total number of 11,500 Civilian Staff, Nigeria Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a total number of 4,000 Staff, Nigeria Defence Headquarters (Army) with the total number of 181,000 Personnel, Nigeria Police Headquarter with the total number of 371,000 Security Personnel that made up a total of 567,500 Persons

Table 1: The Categories of the Target Population

S/No	Categories of the Respondents	Frequency
1	Nigeria Federal Ministry of Defense Civilian Staff	11,500
2	Nigeria Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs	4000
3	Nigeria Army	18,1000
4	Nigeria Police Force	37,1000
	Total	**567,500**

Source: N0ational Bureau of Statistics, 2019: p63

iii. **Sample Size**

Taro Yamane method was used to get the sample size of 400 people which was deemed ideal for this kind of study. Below is a demonstration of how the Taro Yamane method was used to arrive at a 400 sampling size.

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$$

Interpretation
n = sample (size)
N = Population
1 + N = Constant 1 + Population (N)
$(e)^2$ = Tolerable/Marginable error
(Which is constant 0.05)
N= 567,500

$$n = \frac{567,500}{1+ 567,500 \times 0.05^2}$$

$$n = \frac{567,500}{567,501 \times 0.0025}$$

$$n = \frac{567,500}{1,418.7325}$$

n = 567,500 / 1,418.7525
n = 399.999252
400.

iv. **Sampling Procedure**

Table 2: Distribution of Sample Size.

S\N	Ministries	Frequency	Junior	Senior
1	Nigeria Ministry of Defense Civilian Staffs	75	45	30

2	Nigeria Ministry of Foreign Affairs	25	15	10
3	Nigeria Police Force Peacekeeping Operation Department	200	130	70
4	Nigeria Army Operation Department	100	65	35
	Tota	400	255	145

Source: Field Survey, 2019

Method of Data Analysis Sample

The collected data were first checked for errors in the entries, outlining values and any unexpected values. The researchers employed percentages and frequencies to analyse the results from the primary data in a tabular form.

CAUSES OF THE SOMALIA CONFLICT

Generally, Africa has been characterized by chronic conflicts which are largely attributed to colonial legacies, repressive regimes, disastrous economic and political policies, systematic disregard of human liberties, institutionalized corruption, and ongoing civil wars. The causes of the lingering crises in Somalia are not far-fetched from those enumerated above. The complete breakdown of law and order in Somalia stems largely from economic and political problems inherent in most sub-Saharan African states (David-Odigie, 2011). However, the following are the major factors responsible for the Somalia conflicts.

i. Clan Factor

In Somalia, the Somalis ethnic groups are best described as clans. Clanism was a major political resource and Siad Barre made use of this in his regime. The clans are patrilineal and divided into subclans. There

are five clans categorised as noble-Hawiye, Dir, Darod, Isaaq, and Rahanweyn

In the 1980s, Barre filled all important positions in his cabinet and the security forces with members of the three Darood clans-Marehan, Dhulbahante and Ogaden-which were closely related to his clan, reer. Sources state that some tank brigades which are made up of 540 officers had 500 Marehan and were led by a Marehan officer (Compagnon, 1992). The colonels and generals were also part of the president's inner caucus, hence were loyal to him and his relatives (Adam, 1998). This watered down the perception of the Somali army and they were seen mainly as Barre's army (Compagnon, 1992). With this approach, Siad had the support of these clans. Though it could be said that only the leaders were his supporters, these leaders could influence the decision of their followers.

ii. **Competition for Resources and Power**

Current realities confirm the assertion that competition for power and/or resources was the leading cause of conflict among clans and militia groups. The civil war within the Hawiye, the Darod, the Digil, and Mirifl e, and the Isaaq clans was a resource- and/or power-motivated conflict. For instance, the Abgal and the Habargidir clans had never fought throughout their history and in fact, belong to the same clan (Hawiye) and sub-clan (Hiraab). However, when Mogadishu fell to the United Somali Congress (USC) (to which they both belonged) a power struggle broke out between General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed.

According to Barise, & Abdi (2006), the war between the Darod clans was similarly motivated by competition for power and/or resources. First, the Absame and the Harti militias fought over the control of Kismayo. Then the Mareehaan and the Harti clans clashed over the same issue. The recent civil war between the Majerteen sub-clans in Puntland was also motivated by power and resources. When Abdullahi Yusuf was voted out in 2001, he refused to accept his defeat and sought to retain control of the government by force(Barise, & Abdi,2006). The

same kinds of events occurred during the civil violence between the Isaaq clans in Bur'o and Hargeysa, and the continuing clashes between the Digil and Mirifl e clans in the Bay and Bakool regions(Barise, & Abdi,2006).

Therefore, looking at both past and present Somali conflicts, it can be concluded that the most determinant and persistent factor that has ignited and/or sustained the violence has been competition for resources and/or power. As a result, control of a key city (Mogadishu, Kismayo, or Baidoa), key ports or airports, important checkpoints, resource-rich regions, banknotes, foreign aid, or 'technical' (the cars that carry heavy weapons) became closely contested resources among militia groups and various clans.

iii. **Colonial Legacy.**

The European powers (Britain, Italy and France) partitioned what some would call greater Somalia into five parts. Britain took two, Italy one, and France one. The European powers gave the Somali region of Ogaden to Ethiopia's King Menelik to appease him. As Geshekter noted in Elmi (2006), from 1891 to the present, Ethiopia has been expanding to the east. The partitioning of Somalia permanently damaged the Somali people. Hadrawi, a great Somali poet, argues persuasively in several poems that most of the malaise in today's Somalia stems from the colonial system. He claims that the colonial powers destroyed Somalia's socioeconomic system (Elmi,2006).

The effect of the partition continues to haunt the Somali people since, according to this view, two Somali territories remain under the control of Ethiopia and Kenya. In addition, the two regions that formed independent Somalia is experiencing serious problems, and the northern region (former British Somaliland) want to secede from the south.

iv. The Barre Dictatorship

State repression is another second major cause of the civil war. The Somali people experienced twenty-one (21) years of a repressive

military state (1969–1991). The military regime used excessive force and collective punishment to suppress opposition. The people had no mechanisms for registering their discontent. The system did not allow opposition forces to exist, let alone have a voice on important issues When, in 1978, some military officers attempted to overthrow the military regime, the Siad Barre government used the national army and police to punish civilian members of the Majerteen clan. The military subsequently was involved in the killing of civilians, mass abuses and the destruction of areas inhabited by that clan the 1978 failed coup set a precedent for attempts by other Somali groups to challenge the regime. In 1981 some politicians of the Isaaq clan established an opposition movement- the Somali National Movement (SNM) in London, England. Again, the military government started to punish civilians. The Siad Barre regime destroyed Hargeysa and Bur'o and murdered many innocent civilians when the SNM attacked these cities in 1988. Human rights organizations reported that more than fifty thousand people were killed in these conflicts.

In conclusion, the civil war that led to Siad Barre's overthrow had taken place during the Gulf War military operations and had gone largely unnoticed by world public opinion. Later, in early 1991, fighting had taken place in the Bay, Lower Shebelle, and Lower Jubba provinces, far away from the world's attention, since there were no foreigners left in the area, especially international journalists. It was the Mogadishu War (17 November 1991- 26 February 1992) that finally brought the Somalia conflict to the attention of the world (Prunier,1995).

THE AFRICAN UNION(AU) PEACE MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)

The African Union, which is the successor body to the OAU, was born in 2001. It came into existence when the African space had already become notorious for conflicts Therefore, conflict resolution and peacebuilding were expected to be a major concern. The AU since its exception in 2002 has given some indications that it can do better than

the defunct OAU by intervening militarily where peaceful resolution failed. The first military intervention of the AU was in May 2003 when it deployed a peacekeeping force comprising soldiers from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi. AU troops were also deployed to Sudan for peacekeeping in the Darfur conflict before the mission was handed over to the United Nations on 1, January 2008. The AU also sent peacekeeping missions to Somalia (Williams, 2011). It should be noted that one of the objectives of the Africa Union is to promote peace, security, and stability in the continent. It also has among its principles the peaceful resolution of conflict among member states of the union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly (The United Nations,2023**).**

The collapse of the central government of Somalia in 1991 came after years of dictatorial rule by Siad Barre, which fostered civil war. After 26 years of difficult peacekeeping and peacekeeping initiatives, Somalia is still in search of peace. A recent violent confrontation, in May 2007, caused tremendous damage and loss of life and prevented humanitarian relief operations.

Ethiopia launched an incursion into Somalia with US backing, ostensibly to route the Union of Islamic Court (UIC). Previously, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia had been established in Nairobi. The TFG is one of the transitional federal institutions (TFIs) of the Somalia government defined in the transitional federal charter (TFC) adopted in November 2004 by the transitional federal Parliament (TFP), the legislative branch of the TFG (AU, 2004).

On 6th December 2006, the UN Security Council Resolation1725 (2006) authorized 'IGAD and member states of African Union to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia', which was dubbed IGASOM. IGASOM was never deployed to Somalia. On 19 January 2007, the AU Peace Security Council established the African Union peace mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In July 2007 the Somalia National Reconciliation was launched so that representatives of the

various parties and stakeholders in Somalia could discuss national peace and reconstruction. (UN, 2007).

UN SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION ON SOMALIA.

Following the report of the chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in Somalia (PSC/PR/2(LXIX)) and the evaluation and recommendation of the AU Military Staff Committee, the AU Peace, and Security Council authorized the deployment of AMISOM, which is still operating in Somalia, with the following mandate:

i. To provide support for the TFIs in their efforts to stabilize the situation in Somalia and to further dialogue and reconciliation.
ii. To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance.
iii. To create conditions conducive to long-term stabilization, reconstruction, and development in Somalia.

On 20th February 2007, the UN Security Council adopted SC Resolution 1744, authorizing the deployment of AMISOM. The UN supported AMISOM using an assistance cell to the AU in Addis Ababa and by providing military planners. The UN Security Council met with the AU Peace and Security Council on 16th June 2007 to discuss the modalities for deeper collaboration. In particular, both bodies discussed the importance of stabilization in Somalia. AMISOM was launched in March 2007 with 1700 Ugandan troops. Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi, and Burundi have also pledged to deploy troops practice' (AU Peace and Security Council, 2007). The AUs PSC indicated that 'the concept of logistic support for AMISOM shall be based on the model of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). This effectively means that AU Commission shall mobilize logistical support for the TCCs as well as funding from AU member states and partners to ensure that TCCs are reimbursed for the costs incurred in the course of their deployment, based on AU practice' (AU Peace and Security Council, 2007).

AMISOM tried to stabilize parts of Mogadishu and Baido and has a role to play in creating the security conditions required to enable the complete withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. AMISOM is also supporting dialogue and reconciliation.

The European Union supported the deployment of AMISOM with 15 million in Europe. In June 2005 the UK pledged to finance AMISOM with 1.3 million Europe practice' (AU Peace and Security Council, 2007). The UK also provided planning assistance to several potential troops-contributing countries and logistical support for the AU military cell in Addis Ababa. The AU has requested NATO to provide air transportation in support of AMISOM troops' practice' (AU Peace and Security Council, 2007).

The achievements of AMISOM, in Somalia, were made possible by the technical implementation of robust mandates, a conducive political climate and goodwill within and outside Somalia, and the support from the international that the findings of this study have established that APSA through its mechanism AMISOM in its debut in Somalia in 2007, made an incredible impact and substantial contributions to the reinvention of security in Somalia as this lead to the defeat and ejection of the militant Al-Shabaab group from the capital city in Mogadishu in 2011. For more than twenty (20) years of civil strife, Somalia has had a functioning central government and its populace is slowly rebuilding their shattered lives community.

NIGERIA'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE AFRICAN UNION PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN SOMALIA

i. Background to Nigeria's Participation in the AMISOM

Nigeria as a nation has since independence been involved in conflict resolution in various parts of the world, especially Africa. For Nigeria, the defense and promotion of world peace rank as one of the pillars of her foreign policy objectives. In keeping with this, she has demonstrated a willingness to cooperate and to act in concert with other peace-loving

members of the comity of the nation. In her sub-region, Nigeria has led other members to contain conflict and maintain peace in a conflict-prone region. She has been able to achieve this because she possesses leverage and resources, relative to her neighbors. Her search for peace and security has been pursued through bilateral, multilateral and regional security architecture of which she is a pivotal leader. Nigeria has been involved in conflict resolution since 1963 when she sent troops to Congo on a peacekeeping mission in that country.

In 2010, Nigeria deployed its first police officers to Somalia. The first batch of individual police officers (IPO) arrived to serve under the AMISOM umbrella (African Mission in Somalia- AMISOM,2020). Nigeria was one the few countries that quickly move on its own to Somalia when another member state of ECOWAS, AU, and UN showed a lackadaisical attitude towards the Somalia conflicts among other things she did in Somalia. Nigeria's participation in the Somalia conflict is in pursuance of her foreign policy objectives. Nigeria's participation in the Somalia peacekeeping significantly helped in the restoration of relative peace in Somalia. As revealed in the research, before the arrival of Nigerian contingents in Somalia, they were able to bring relative peace in these conflict return areas. Nigeria contributed over 770 and 1,100 Battalions and other personnel and equipment to the Somalia conflict, engaged in patrol, protected people in IDPs Camps, and engaged in the political process. Though Nigeria had its own administrative, logistic, and operational challenges in the course of executing this peacekeeping operation, there is no denial of the fact that Nigeria played a significant role in the restoration of peace in Somalia. Nigeria's leadership role in the Somalia peacekeeping mission significantly helped in the restoration of peace in Somalia.

Nigeria has been an active participant in UN peacekeeping missions, deploying military contingents, unarmed military observers, military staff officers, formed police units, police advisors and civilian experts to over 25 UN missions. Nigeria is currently one of the largest

UN contributing countries with military and civilian personnel deployed in ten UN peacekeeping operations and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Nigeria has also played pivotal roles in other non-UN missions in Africa. As the preponderant power in West Africa, Nigeria has been the main provider of military and other resources for ECOWAS peace operations to the tune of US$8 billion in its various missions in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, and Sierra Leone (Osimen, 2015 cited in Agaba and Adeniji, 2018).).

ii. CONTINGENTS NIGERIA SENT TO THE SOMALIA PEACEKEEPING MISSION UNDER AMISOM FROM 2010 TO 2019.

Table 3: Numbers of Nigeria Army Officers Sent to Somalia Peacekeeping Mission Under the Umbrella of AMISOM between 2010 and 2019

S/NO	Year	ARMY OFFICERS
	2010/2019	**Frequency**
1	2010	120
2	2011	70
3	2012	120
4	2013	20
5	2014	32
6	2015	27
7	2016	15
8	2017	20
9	2018	17

10	2019	19
	Total	460

Source: Field Survey, 2019

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Table 4: The Nigeria Police Officers sent to the peacekeeping Mission in Somalia from 2010 to 2019 under the leadership of the current peacekeeping Director and his predecessors from the Police Force Headquarters Abuja

S/NO	**Year**	**POLICE OFFICERS**
	2010/2019	Frequency
1	2010	160
2	2011	160
3	2012	120
4	2013	160
5	2014	160
6	2015	200
7	2016	140
8	2017	140
9	2018	160
10	2019	160
	Total	1,560

Source: Field Survey, 2019

AREAS NIGERIAN CONTINGENTS WERE DEPLOYED IN SOMALIA

Gandu Monday and Yohanna Alhassan (Oral Interview, 2019) cited in Andrew (2021) explained that Nigeria contingents were deployed to areas in Somalia at various times during the operations of AMISOM: African unions adopted four a mission-wide. The four areas Nigerian forces were deployed are:

i. Sector (headquartered in Mogadishu which covered the Bandir, Middle Shabelle, and Lower Shabelle regions.
ii. Sector (headquartered in Kismayu) covered the Gedo, and Middle Juba regions.
iii. Sector (headquartered in Baidoa) covering the Bay and Bakool regions.
iv. Sector (headquartered in Belet Weyne) Hiraan region.

They were deployed to these areas to perform the following functions

i. Protection of AMISOM personnel via escorts and by providing VIP protection where necessary, hereunder accompanying IPOs
ii. Protection of other international staff and visitors, including those from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Somalia (UNSOM,) the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), and other UN agencies via escorts and by providing VIP protection where necessary.
iii. VIP protection and escorts for senior FGS figures (Andrew, 2021)

DATA PRESENTATION

This section of the research deals with the presentation and analysis of data with particular reference to primary data.

Table 5: Sex of Respondents

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	215	61.4
Female	135	38.6
Total	**350**	**100.0**

Source: of survey 2019

The above table 5. shows that male is 215 representing 61.4 percent, while the remaining 135 are female, representing 38.6 percent.

Table 6: Age Distribution of Respondents

Age of th respondents	Frequency	Percentage
20-30 years	230	65.7
31-40 years	70	20.0
41-50 years	25	7.1
51-60 years	8	2.3
60 years and above	17	4.9
Total	350	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2019

Table 6 above shows that 230 of the respondents representing 65.7 are between 20-30 years, 70 people representing 20.0 percent are between ages 31 and 40 years, 25 representing 7.1 percent are between ages 41 to 50 years, 8 of the respondents representing 2.3 percent are between age

51 and 60 years while the remaining 17 persons representing 4.9 are 60 years and above. From the above analysis, the respondents between the age of 20 to 30 have the high numbers of respondents, while 51 to 60 were the lowest.

Table 7: Educational Qualification of Respondents

Qualification	**Frequency**	Percent
Secondary	180	51.4
B.Sc. /HND	105	30.0
Master degree	50	14.3
Other	15	4.3
Total	**350**	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2019

From Table 7 above on the educational qualification of respondents, those with B.Sc./HND are 180 representing 51.4 percent, those with secondary school certificates are 105representing 51.4percent, and those with master's degrees are 50 representing 14.3 percent. While those with other qualifications, e.g. (diploma or professional certificates) are 15 representing 4.3. From the above analysis, those with secondary had the high number of respondents, while those with other qualifications were the lowest.

Table 8: Occupation of Respondents

Occupations	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Military(Nigeria Defense Headquarters)	105	30.0
Police(Nigeria Police Headquarters)	140	40.0

Civil Servants(Nigeria Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	45	12.9
Civil Servants(Nigeria Federal Ministry of Defense)	60	17.1
Total	**350**	**100**

Source: Field survey, 2019

From Table 8 above on the educational qualification, those in the military, i.e. the Nigeria defense headquarter are 105 representing 30.0 percent, and the police from the Nigeria Police Headquarter is 140 representing 40.0 percent. Nigeria Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 45 representing 12.9 percent, while Nigeria Federal Ministry of Defense is 60 representing 17.1 Percent. From the above analysis, those in the military have the highest number of respondents, while those in the Ministry of foreign affairs have 45 people.

Table 9: Opinion on whether Somalia's repressive regime, marginalisation, poverty, high rate of unemployment, bad political and economic policies and sit-tight syndrome are the cause of the Somalia conflict.

Options	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Agree	156	44.6
Strongly Agree	93	26.6
Neutral	0	0
Disagree	65	18.6
Strongly Disagree	36	10.2
Total	**350**	**100**

Source: Field Survey, 2019

From Table 9 above, 156 respondents agreed that repressive regime, marginalisation, poverty, high rate of unemployment, bad political and economic policies, and sit tight syndrome and among other factors which are related to corruption were the cause of the Somalia conflict and represent 44.6 percent, 93 strongly agreed, representing 26.6, none of them had a neutral view, 65 people representing 18.6 percent disagreed, while 36 people representing 10.2 percent strongly disagreed. The result agrees with Elmi's (2006) position when he said the causes of Somalia's conflict have been that colonial legacy, politicised clan system, corruption, sit tight syndrome, and lack of commitment and political will which led to economic stagnation in a country blessed with great natural resources enough to cater for everyone, but for the elites preposterously accrued to themselves and their cronies the wealth of the nation.

Table 10: Opinion on whether the AU has made an effort toward the resolution of the Somalia conflict.

Options	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Agree	135	38.6
Strongly Agree	102	29.1
Neutral	26	7.4
Disagree	52	14.6
Strongly Disagree	35	10
Total	**350**	**100**

Source: Field Survey, 2019

Table 10 above shows that 135 respondents agreed that African Union plays a vital role in the resolution of the Somalia conflict which represents 38.6 percent, and 102 people representing 29.1 percent strongly agreed. Those who were neutral are 26 representing 7.4, 52

people representing 14.6 percent disagreed, and the remaining 35 people representing 10 percent strongly disagreed. Therefore, 237 respondents with 67.7 percent out of the 350 questionnaires agreed that Nigeria's participation in the Somalia peacekeeping g yields a positive result in bringing relative peace in Somalia.

Table 11: Opinion on whether Nigeria's participation under AMISOM is significant in the resolution of the Somalia conflict.

Options	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Agree	159	45.4
Strongly Agree	129	36.9
Neutral	0	0
Disagree	44	12.6
Strongly Disagree	18	5.1
Total	**350**	**100**

Source: Field Survey, 2019

From above table 11, 159 agreed that Nigeria plays a significant role in the resolution of the Somalia conflict which represents 45.4 percent,129 of the respondents strongly agreed 36.9 percent, no one was neutral, and 44 respondents disagreed representing 12.6 percent, while other 18 people strongly disagreed representing 5.1 percent. Thus, 288 respondents out of 350 questionnaires agreed with 82.3 percent agreeing that Nigeria plays a significant role in Somalia peacekeeping.

Table 12: Opinion on whether Nigeria's Participation under the AMISOM suffered setbacks arising from a lack of staff, resources, finance and logistical constraints

Respondents Response	Frequency	Percent
Agree	89	25.4
Strongly Agree	106	30.3
Neutral	68	19.4
Disagree	43	12.3
Strongly Disagree	44	12.6
Total	**350**	**100**

Source: Field Survey, 2019

From Table 12, 89 above, people agreed that Nigeria's peacekeeping mission in Somalia suffered a setback that is related to a lack of funds, personnel and equipment which hinder its performance and this represents 25.4, 106 people strongly agree, while 68 people were neutral representing 19.4 percent, and 43 respondents disagreed representing 12.3 percent.

Table 13: Opinion on whether Nigeria's participation in the African Union to Somalia conflicts is in pursuance of her foreign policy principles and objectives.

Respondents Response	Frequency	Percent
Agree	215	61.5
Strong Agree	108	30.9
Neutral	5	1.4
Disagree	18	5.1
Strong Disagree	4	1.1
Total	**350**	**100**

Source: Field Survey, 2019

In above table 13, 215 respondents representing 61.5 percent agreed that Nigeria's participation in the African Union to Somalia conflicts was in pursuance of its Afro-centric foreign policy principles in promoting regional and international peace and security. 108 respondents representing 30.9 percent strongly agreed,5 of the respondents representing 1.4 percent are neutral, 18 respondents disagreed representing 5.1 percent 18 while 4 people representing 1.1 percent strongly disagreed. Thus, 323 respondents with 92.4 percent agree that Nigerian intervention to resolve the Somalia conflict was inclined to its Afro-centric foreign policy principle in promoting regional and world peace and security.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This part of the research is dedicated to the discussion of the findings of the research reconciling them with the objectives of the study.: The findings are:

i. The Somalia conflict is caused by corruption, sit tight syndrome, lack of commitment and political will, nepotism and cronyism characterized by state institutions, and also competition for resources and power, repression by the military regime and the colonial legacy are the background causes of the conflict.
ii. AMISOM has achieved a lot in Somalia and this was made possible through the technical implementation of robust mandates, a conducive political climate leading to the defeat and ejection of the militant Al-Shabaab group from the capital city in Mogadishu and other areas in Somalia
iii. Nigeria's participation in the Somalia peacekeeping significantly helped in the restoration of relative peace in Somalia with the contribution of over 770 and 1,100 Battalions and other personnel and equipment to the Somalia conflict, engaged in patrol, protected people in IDPs Camps, engaged in the political process.

iv. Nigeria encountered challenges in the course of its participation in AMISOM. These ranged from lack of adherence to the signed peace agreements which made it difficult for the peacekeepers to operate effectively, to lack of integrated pre-deployment training created problems of liaison and interoperability in the multinational force and hostile environment which hindered the free movement of people

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, the conflict resolution responses of AU and Nigeria in particular to the Somalia crises despite some measures of success have been greatly affected by the complex nature of Somalia's politics which ranged from a politically fragmented Somalia across clan lines and competition among major clan groups for political supremacy and control of economic resources which have complicated the hope for achieving sustainable peace and economic development as well as the establishment of the central government. Based on the highlighted issues, the research makes the following recommendations:

i. The Somalia government needs to demonstrate a strong political will in the fight against corruption, economic injustice, marginalization, and poverty, through the creation of an enabling environment for Somali's economic sustainability through job creation, agriculture and skill acquisition
ii. The AU should give more attention to civilian knowledge and skills empowerment as this will enhance the effectiveness of the AU peacekeepers to achieve their set goals and objective for the restoration of peace in Somalia.
iii. Monitoring and evaluation, proper training and retraining of Nigerian peacekeepers, and acquisition of modern equipment should be given more attention. More so, more funds should be made available for peacekeeping operations.

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