SEEKING PROSPERITY ON THE MOVE: AFRICAN UNION, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

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Abstract

The article examines the role of the African Union in shaping the migration process and outcomes through various policies and programmes under the organization's auspices. The article, which employed qualitative methodology and relied on secondary data drawn from books, peer-reviewed journals, AU Reports and internet sources, seeks to interrogate the contributions of AU to continental and international migration patterns and outcomes. The findings of the study reveal that since the establishment of the AU in 2002, the institution has shaped migration patterns and outcomes through its policies and programmes, among which include the use of Regional Economic Cooperations to foster continental migration, the recognition of Africans in the diaspora as the sixth region among others. Based on the study's findings, the article concludes that AU overhauling African migration frameworks has contributed significantly to mainstreaming Africa into the migration-development nexus and changing the old narratives of brain drain to brain gain and diaspora development. The article recommends that the AU focus on rebuilding Africa based on its Agenda 2063 by providing sustainable migration governance architecture that makes Africa a destination zone, coordinating Africans in diaspora for Africa's development and fostering African socio-economic and political emancipation to reduce African migration quest.

Keywords: Migration, African Union, Development, Diaspora, Africa

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Introduction

The political economy of mobility and diaspora in Africa remains a major concern given the interconnections between migration and development (Olawale and Kelechi, 2023). Although migration is not recent in Africa, an exponential increase in Africans moving out of the continent has become a matter of concern. The increasing number of African victims of human trafficking, millions struggling to cross the Mediterranean using boats, and the increasing rate of passport acquisition are irrefutable evidence of Africa's quest to migrate out of the continent in search of a better life. According to the International Organisation Migration 2022 World Migration Report, there are currently 281 million migrants globally, signifying that 3.6% of the global population is on the move (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2022). However, while Africa has not been an important destination over the years, it remains an important source of immigrants globally. The exponential increase in African immigrants migrating to other regions is a testament to this. According to the International Organisation Migration, in 2020, an estimation of about 19.5 million Africans were estimated to be residing in other regions (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou 2022). Hence, this exponential increase in African immigrants has shifted the issue of migration from individual scope to the realm of national and global governance.

Until recently, particularly, national governments globally have begun to acknowledge the importance of immigrants and migration to individual households, states and global development. This recognition has brought into mobility space concepts such as migration-development nexus, diaspora-development pattern, diaspora engagement policy, and migration governance. In addition, a new perspective on immigrants now considers immigrants as important partners in the growth and development of their country, unlike the past reading, which categorized them as factors contributing to the underdevelopment of their countries. The primary driving factor for these initiatives is to bring into global debates the essence of immigrants and global migration governance (Hillifield and Wang, 2000; Fraist and Frauser, 2011)

This is a particular truism of the African continent with a dynamic history of migration globally. However, given the dominance of these new readings, African countries are also keen to bring Africans in the diaspora into the throes of African development by building diaspora engagement policies that can serve as a bridge through which Africans in the diaspora can relate with their countries of origin. In light of these growing concerns, the African Union championed the cause by bringing the migration-development concerns into the continental political economy and development space by making Africans in the diaspora the sixth region of the continent. However, for over a decade, the African Union has been developing coherent and sustainable policy through programmes and institutions to fashion out a migration-driven development agenda that can benefit. It is high time an evaluation of the African Union efforts be examined vis-a-vis African socio-economic and political emancipation through a migration lens (Olawale and Kelechi, 2023).

International Dimension Of Africa Union Migration-Development Framework

An attempt to understand the African Union international migration-development framework must first consider the historical dynamics that contribute to the formation of the African population in the diaspora vis-a-vis the socio-economic and political relations between the citizen (individual) and the state (Adepoju, 1995; Swindell, 1995). Within the context of the African diaspora outside the continent, the role of international trade links such as the trans-Saharan trade (Prange, 2006), the Trans-Atlantic slave trade (Rawley, 2005; Eltis, 2007), the India-Ocean trade (Allen 1993) contributed in no small measure to the movement of African to other continent and the wider world. Beyond the scope of international trade links, the relationship between Africa and Europe marked the period of colonial rule and contributed to the movement of Africans to the countries which participated in colonial rule (Boogart and Emmer, 1986; Emmer, 2012). During colonial rule, colonies were not only considered extension territories of metropolitan countries but coordinated the human and material resources of the

colonies towards the development of the metropolis. The colonial idea of 'civilization,' 'dark continent,' and 'underdeveloped' continent was designed to ensure that colonial subjects perceive the continent as inferior, thereby igniting 'colonial subject' vehemence to migrate to the metropolis.

Beyond the colonial period, the political and economic state of African countries' affairs in post-independence has also propelled the migration of Africans to Europe. The inability of several African countries to fashion out sustainable political and development patterns in the post-independent period contributed in no small measure to the decision of Africans to migrate. During the post-independence period, electioneering crises, the incessant military incursion into politics, and the inability of African post-independence leaders to fashion out development patterns contributed to the movement of Africans. As far back as the 1980s, African countries have continually lost the brightest minds to developed countries (Nwajiuba, 2007; UNECA, 2000; Teferra, 1997). Evidence abounds from perennial natural resources conflicts, underdevelopment, and lack of basic socio-economic facilities. Among the ill-implemented policies that contributed to the brain drain and migration of Africa's brightest and most professional minds was the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). (Olawale, 2021)

Beyond the 1980s, African migration has also been influenced by several factors, including insecurity. The rising spate of terrorism and insurgency in Africa, as in the case of Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and ethnic militias fighting over resource control, have contributed to millions of decisions to migrate. Also, income differences and the need to access sustainable socio-economic livelihood facilities such as education, health, and protection are shaping the migration of Africans to developed countries. In the London Times' October 11 published report, Nigeria students immigrants in the United Kingdom numbered 34, 931 with 31, 898 dependents (*London Times*, 2022).

Given the current phase of global migration governance designed to shape the migration-development framework, the African Union has not only keyed into this development. However, it has also

made a giant stride in fashioning the platform on which migration-development policies and programmes can thrive. Hence, the culmination of these push factors has contributed significantly to the statistics of Africans leaving outside the continent. Utilizing the diaspora's potential for Africa's development received less emphasis under the dissolved OAU. Given these circumstances, nevertheless, and the OAU's incapacity to meet Africa's modern socio-economic and political needs, African leaders opted to revamp the organisation to address current African concerns. Hence, the birth of the African Union (AU). The Constitutive Act of the Union was approved at the Lomé Summit in 2000 and formally introduced on July 10, 2002, at the Durban Summit. The original Constitutive Act of the AU, like the OAU, did not include the diaspora population of the continent.

Before the Constitutive Act was changed and the African diaspora was designated as the sixth development region, the AU pursued policies relating to the diaspora. Among these include the creation of the Citizens and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO) in 2001 to direct AU's diaspora engagement and the Western Hemisphere African diaspora Network (WHADN), which was introduced in Washington, DC, in December 2002 at the First AU-Western Hemisphere diaspora Forum. To address African mobility issues, AU also worked closely with the World Bank and International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Commonwealth Business Council (CBC), Africa Recruit, and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) (Kamei, 2011).

After the agreement to alter the Constitutive Act of the Union was agreed upon during the Extra-Ordinary Summit of the OAU convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2003, the diaspora lexicon was incorporated into the AU development framework. Following the summit, the diaspora was added as the "sixth region of the continent" to go along with the five already-existing geographic regions of East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, South Africa, and North Africa, as well as the diasporas of the Americas, Europe, the Caribbean, Australia, and Asia. As a result, Article 3 of the amendment after the Constitutive Act on February 3, 2003, included the African

diaspora (q). To construct the African Union FMP, member states are urged in Article 3(q) to "welcome and promote the full involvement of the African diaspora as an integral element of our continent." The AU formally recognized the African Diaspora in 2006 as the organization's "sixth area." The Global African diaspora Summit, held in Sandton, South Africa, on Africa Day, May 25, 2012, further demonstrated the AU's interest in Africans living abroad (Jinmi, 2017: 47). Also, the African Union (AU) and the South African government sponsored several regional consultative conferences (RCC) for the African diaspora before the summit to establish policies and create programmes to ensure successful diaspora integration in Africa's growth and development (AU, 2007).

The 'Agenda 2063: Africa We Want' — adopted in 2015 — also recognises "the active engagement of the diaspora can be one of the key drivers of change for Africa's development; contributing to the strengthening of African economic independence through investment, expertise, and general political, cultural, and social solidarity" in keeping with the AU's outstanding efforts to engage its diaspora. By 2030, the diaspora will be fully incorporated into democratic processes, according to Agenda 2063, which called for establishing agencies for diaspora issues in every member state. By 2025, dual citizenship will be the norm for people in the diaspora. Additionally, out of the 150 members in the General Assembly, the Union provides 20 seats for the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council to include the diaspora (ECOSOCC). (Bolaji, 2015; Kerubo, 2021)

One of the contentious issues surrounding the AU's designation of the diaspora as the sixth area was the particular context of "who may be referred to be African in the diaspora." The AU organised a workshop in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, between June 2 and June 5, 2004, to examine suitable definitions for Africans in the diaspora as part of engineering, a considered fit term (Jinmi 2017: 43-44). After careful consideration, the Permanent Representatives Committee of Ambassadors decided to reject the workshop's recommendations in advance of the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, which would take place in Abuja, Nigeria, from January 27 to January 28, 2005

(Jinmi 2017: 43–44; General Report TW/diaspora 1, "African Union Technical Workshop on the Relationship with the diaspora, 2–5 June 2004). An expert meeting from each Member State was then called to evaluate the definition. The AU definition of the diaspora was revised and approved as the AU definition during the AU Expert Conference in Addis Ababa between April 11 and April 12, 2005. The African diaspora, as defined, is made up of "people of African descent residing outside the continent, regardless of their citizenship and country and who are eager to contribute to the growth of the continent and the construction of the African Union" (Report of the Meeting of Experts from the Member States on the Definition of the diaspora, 2005).

The AU definition emphasises the place of development. The definition – "willing to contribute to the development of the continent' emphasises that anyone claiming to be African in the diaspora must be committed to the development of Africa. The definition implies that having African ancestors or descendants does not qualify an individual as an African diaspora except for the willingness to contribute to Africa's growth and development. Ben Page and Claire Mercer (2018: 146-147) also claim the AU definition does not factor in why an individual of African descent left Africa but is rather concerned with such individual commitment to African growth and development.

Although these objectives have not yet been achieved, a development towards more institutionalisation of diaspora participation in Africa can be seen. The Africa Diaspora Health Initiative was established by the African Union Commission in September 2008 to offer a venue for health professionals from the African diaspora to share knowledge, abilities, and expertise with their colleagues in Africa. Additionally, CIDO pursues diaspora projects to strengthen AU-diaspora ties, including the Diaspora Engagement Self-Assessment Tool (DESAT) and the African Diaspora Investment Fund (ADIF). Twenty-one (21) African countries have a diaspora engagement policy or are in the process of drafting one, and thirty (30) have at least one institution related to diaspora among the forty-one (41) African countries covered by the European Union Global Diaspora Facility (EUDiF) diaspora mapping exercise (EUDif, 2021). After the

proclamation, Uganda created its diaspora engagement policy in 2013 (EUDif, 2021). Also, 2014 saw the adoption of diaspora involvement policies in Cape Verde, Kenya, and Morocco and the drafting of one in Tanzania. But most diaspora participation plans were implemented (or created) after Agenda 2063 was put forward in 2015 (Burundi, Ethiopia, and Mauritius in 2015; DRC, Liberia, and Zimbabwe in 2016; Djibouti in 2017; Chad, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia in 2019). (EUDif, 2021). diaspora engagement policies cut across creating a sustainable economic platform through which the diaspora can invest, extending political rights (voting and dual citizenship status), providing social and welfare services to the diaspora, and celebrating diaspora Day, among others (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2016; Gamlen 2008; Aguinas and Newland 2012). The hallmark of these policies is to build the diaspora as partners and harness the potential of the diaspora to realise the gains of the migration-development framework (Gamlen 2008; Aguinas and Newland 2012).

Since the implementation of the African Union diaspora framework, the African government has keyed into drafting, initiating and implementing policies that focus on building the bridges of the relationship between the Africans in the diaspora and their home countries. These sets of policies are designated as diaspora engagement policies. African countries have witnessed notable development in building the AU diaspora framework. On the continental level, the increase in remittance inflow which contributes to state Gross Domestic Profit and foreign earnings and alleviates household poverty, cannot be underestimated. In 2019 and 2020, Egypt and Nigeria were among the top global remittance-receiving states while it covers the largest share of Somalia and South Sudan's Gross Domestic Profit. Also, given the increasing commitment of the diaspora to the development of their countries of origin, governments of these states are now leveraging diaspora funds to drive growth and development. In Nigeria and Tunisia, the Nigeria Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (2017-2020) and Tunisia National Development Plan 2016-2020 recognize the diaspora bond as an important source of revenue to achieve the economic growth and development plan ((EUDif, 2021).

The African Union's sixth region also provides the diaspora with the platform to intervene in the socio-economic development of their countries. There are records of diaspora-funded skill and knowledge(intellectual) transfer. One of the widely acknowledged transfer skills is the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme implemented by UNDP, the IOM Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) initiatives and Connecting Diaspora for Development (CD4D). TOKTEN programmes facilitate temporary assignments of diaspora professionals in countries of origin. Also, there is an increase in African diaspora professionals' organisations to contribute to their homeland. Among these include the German-Moroccan Skills Network (DMK), which organizes regular skills transfer programmes in Morocco, sometimes in partnership with the private sector. The Zambia-UK Health Workforce Alliance (ZUKHWA) is a partnership between Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust (London, UK) and a network of Zambian-based organisations. The iMED programme (Improving Medical Education and Health Care Delivery through Diaspora Engagement) links doctors and nurses in Cameroon with Cameroonian medical, pharmacy and dentistry students in Germany, among others (EUDif, 2021; Olawale and Kelechi, 2023).

African Union And The Continental Dimension Of Migration Development Framework

Beyond the global focus, the African Union has also sought to develop Africa's intra-continental migration framework for Africa's growth and development. Intra-Africa migration also constitutes an important framework through which the continent can fashion out patterns of growth and development internally and without dependence on the wider world. Arguably, intra-Africa migration is not a new phenomenon. Like any other basis of population movement in Africa, the movement of Africans from one region to another started within the African continent before the advent of the European colonial powers (Adepoju, 1995). During the pre-colonial period, Africans migrated across the colonial-governed regions on a seasonal and permanent

basis. During this period, migration was driven by socio-economic factors such as the need to access more agricultural lands, seasonal migrants, and traders (Swindelle 1995). Colonial economic policies such as the urban centres, transportation infrastructures, and cash crops facilitated large-scale migrations and the labour movement in Africa. Colonialism further exacerbated the scope and intensity of intra-African migration and governance through delineated borders.

The African Union (AU) has promoted the migration-development framework through Regional Economic Cooperation (RECs) to support the free movement of people, products, and services. The African Economic Community Treaty (Abuja Treaty of June 1991) emphasizes regional and continental policies for member states to implement. The Free Movement Policy (FMP) consists of three phases: Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence, and Right of Establishment. The FMP is a crucial cornerstone for achieving the AEC Fifth Stage (2019-2023). However, the adoption of the Protocol by AU member states has been slow, causing its implementation to be delayed. As of July 16, 2019, only four countries, Mali, Rwanda, Niger, and Sao Tome & Principe, out of 55 African nations, have approved the Protocol (Clayton and Rukema, 2020; Alan, 2021).

Table 1: Stages of African Economic Community (AEC) implementation

Stage	Duration	Task
1	Six years (1994–1999)	Strengthen existing RECs; create new RECs
2	Eight years (2000–2007)	Stabilize tariff and non-tariff barriers; strengthen sectoral integration; coordinate REC activity.
3	Ten years (2008–2017)	Establish regional free trade areas and customs unions
4	Two years (2018–2019)	Harmonize REC tariff and non-tariff systems to establish a continental customs union.

5	Four years (2020–2023)	Establish the African Common Market
6	Five years (2024–2028)	The final establishment of AEC: monetary Union and other institutions of the community

Source: (AU 2021)

The Protocol of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence, and Right of Establishment outlines three phases for member states to achieve this goal. Phase One involves implementing the right of entry and abolition of visa requirements, while Phase Two focuses on residence and establishment. The final phase commits member states to adopt an African passport and promote intra-Africa migration governance. RECs have also adopted various policies and legal frameworks to facilitate the free movement of people at the sub-regional level, aligning with the Migration Policy Framework for Africa adopted in Banjul, Gambia, in 2006. The AU Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA 2018-2030) and Plan of Action adopted by member states in 2018 are some of the REC's FMP policies (Clayton and Rukema, 2020).

Table 2: Regional Economic Cooperation Free Movement Policies

Organisation	Free Movement Policies Instruments
ECOWAS	1975 ECOWAS Treaty; The 1979 Free Protocol Movement. Other free movement initiatives include: the eECOWAS Brown Card Motor Vehicle Insurance of 1982; the ECOWAS Travel Certificate of 1985, replaced with Intra-ECOWAS Travel and the National Biometric Identity Card in 2015
EACH	The EAC Common Market Protocol; EAC Protocol on the free movement

COMESA	The 1992 original treaty; 1994The Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visas as early as 1984; The Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Residence in 1998
SADC	The Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons was drafted in 1996 (later revised and adopted in 2005)
AMU	The three-member states have adopted the Free Movement Protocol.
CEN-SAD	Free movement remains stagnant but is promoted through temporary bilateral agreements, such as that between Sudan and Libya.
IGAD	No protocol but a Bilateral free movement agreement between IGAD members such as Kenya-Uganda, Ethiopia-Djibouti and Kenya and Ethiopia
ECCAS/CEMAC	The Treaty establishing ECCAS; the 1983 Protocol on Freedom of Movement and Rights of Establishment of Nationals of Members States. A decision on free movement was made in January 1990 and amended in June 2000 with the enactment date as 2005; decisions are still ongoing. Free movement is only effective in four CEMAC states – Chad, Cameroon, Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while other member states require a visa for fellow ECCAS citizens. The problem of security has been identified as a major stumbling block to the implementation of the Protocol.

Source: African Union Commission and The International Organization for Migration (2018)


The importance of intra-African migration cannot be underestimated. Intra-African migration is critical to achieving the

African Economic Community (AEC) under the Abuja treaty under the African Union auspices. The stages attached to actualizing AEC (six stages: see Table 2) require that the movement of people, goods and services are not hampered. Also, the African Union African Continent Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) was recently developed to promote continental economic relations and "unlock Africa's tremendous potential. AfCFTA is one of the key projects of the African Union (AU.) Agenda 2063 (AUC 2015). It is also believed that when established, this historic Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) will be the world's largest, relative to the EU and other free trade blocs. AfCFTA aims to create a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of persons (AUC, 2018).

As the importance of AfCFTA in boosting continental and regional trade and repositioning African countries as key players in global economic relations cannot be disputed, it borders on intra-African trade in implementing these policies and initiatives such as AfCFTA cannot be under-emphasised. Statistical estimates show that AfCFTA will stimulate total African exports by 4 per cent (US$25.3 billion) and result in an overall 52 per cent (US$34.6 billion) increase in intra-African trade compared to the baseline of trade reforms in 2022—with expansion covering a wide range of sectors, including agriculture and agro-processing, industry and services. Trade in industrial goods is expected to increase by 53 per cent between 2010 and 2022. Drawing from these two economic policies, it remains evident that the AU's promotion of free movement through regional cooperation remains an important means of repositioning Africa.

According to UNECA's African Regional Integration Index Report of 2019 (UNECA, 2019), ECOWAS had the highest number of countries performing well in facilitating the free movement of people. Thus ECOWAS was the best performing REC in facilitating the free movement of people with an index score of 0.733, followed by EAC (0.664 score), SADC (0.49 score), AMU (0.438 score), CEN-SAD (0.508 score), IGAD (0.54 score), ECCAS (0.469 score), and COMESA (0.385 score).

Graph 1: Performance of African RECs on Free Movement of People as of 2019



Source: Author's construction based on data extracted from the African Regional Integration Index Report of 2019 (ECA, 2019 Report)

The UNECA's African Regional Integration Index Report 2019 ranks ECOWAS as the best-performing REC with a Free Movement of People index score of 0.73. Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo, and Cote d'Ivoire are the top-performing countries in ECOWAS. EAC follows with a 0.66 index score, with Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, and Uganda being the best-performing EAC Partner States. Other top-performing countries include Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Comoros, Somalia, Djibouti, and Mauritania in CEN-SAD, Comoros, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi in SADC, Rwanda, Central Africa Republic, Gabon and Congo in ECCAS, Mauritania, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco in AMU, and Somalia, Djibouti, Comoros, and Rwanda in COMESA. The lowest-performing countries include South Africa, Namibia, Egypt, Morocco, Cameroon, Algeria, Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Libya.

Setting Au-Diaspora And Migration Framework: Key Systematic Issues

The description of Africa as a mobile continent is borne out of the exponential growth of Africans on the move. The past readings where exponential increase defined as brain drain is currently considered through the AU diaspora initiatives from the lens of development tapped through diaspora engagement policies. However, despite the development, contending issues could affect the full realisation of the AU-initiative potential. The crises emanating from ongoing insecurity, terrorism and insurgency must be addressed. From the Al-Shabaab in Somali to Boko Haram in Nigeria to Da na Ambassagou and Jamat Nusrat Al-Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) in Mali are frustrating AU-diaspora initiatives. The 2021 Global Terrorism Index published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP, 2021) reveals that between the ranks of 1-100, twenty-seven (27) out of fifty-four (54) African countries are included. Despite its large diaspora and resources, Nigeria is ranked third on the 2021 Global Terrorism Index (IEP, 2021).

The problem of insecurity has made millions of Africans struggle to migrate to developed countries rather than explore the potentialities of intra-Africa migration. Terrorism and insurgencies significantly impact the AU-diaspora initiative and intra-Africa migration. In 2019, Sub-Saharan African death from terrorism in 2000 was 7, 612; by 2019, African countries recorded 44, 615 deaths (IEP, 2020). The above stats show that terrorism and insurgency prevent African countries from securing the environment for African diasporas to make informed contributions and investments. The insecurity will affect Africans in the diaspora commitment to development, especially in establishing businesses and industries that could boost African Countries' Gross Domestic Profit (GDP). In the World Bank ranking on Ease of Doing Business, out of 190 countries ranked, only Mauritius, Kenya has an ease of doing business score of more than 70 per cent while only eight (8) African countries are ranked between 1 and 100.

Leadership corruption has affected diaspora trust in African governments utilizing diaspora-generated funds for designated national projects. The problem of corruption and the unaccountable

government also affects Africans in the diaspora's commitment to partner with their home government. The Transparency Index corruption ranking shows that forty-nine (49) African countries' corruption index average score for 2020 was 33 out of 100 (CPI, 2021). Of the 49 countries ranked, 44 still score below 50 (CPI 2021). This reinforces the perennial problem of corruption and the urgent need for African governments to implement anti-corruption policies if greater economic participation of Africans in the diaspora is expected. In addition, the diaspora's role in Countries of Origin's political affairs is another major challenge. While there has been significant improvement in some African countries, several African countries are still struggling with providing the diaspora with the platform to become involved in the political affairs of their Countries of Origin (Olawale and Kelechi, 2023).

In the context of intra-African migration, African leaders' lackadaisical attitude to developing the African continent, irrespective of the odds, has also hampered intra-African migration. Foreigners (Chinese, Indians, Lebanese and Asians alongside their multinational firms) are provided with a supportive environment to thrive while Africans on the African continent are attacked frequently and prevented from contributing their quota to the growth and development of the continent. Political and security concerns are premised on the status ascribed to the borders across Africa. While some see the border as an open area meant to facilitate trade and economic activities, many continue to see it as a symbol of their sovereignty which should not be negotiated for no reason. Hence, when meetings are held, brilliant policies are drafted, but when they return to their respective spaces, implementation becomes problematic, as pointed out by Okumu (2009).

The rise of authoritarian regimes and coup d'état in Africa poses a huge threat to existing democratization and efforts to harness diaspora potential and develop intra-Africa migration. Apart from Africa's experience with military intervention in politics during the early years of independence and African leader sit-tight syndrome, the new wave of military and authoritarian regimes has affected the African

effort to reconstruct its political identity as stable and progressing (Adeoye, 2022). In August 2020, coupled with the removal of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and the installation of Bah Ndaw as the President by Colonel Assimi Goïta. Also, in March 2021, an attempted coup was recorded in Niger. In April 2021, the third coup in the Sahel unfolded in Chad after President Idriss Deby, who had ruled for over 30 years, was killed on the battlefield (Adeoye, 2022). In May 2021, Assimi Goïta struck again by May 2021, removed President Ndaw, and installed himself as the President of Mali. The spill-over effect of the waves of coups in the zone hit Guinea in September 2021, as the President of Guinea, Alpha Condé, was removed by Special Forces commander Mamady Doumbouya. Lastly, in October 2021, General Abdel Fattah Burhan led a military coup leading to the removal of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 and civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok (Adeoye, 2022). The above cases reveal that Africa lacks the political environment and stability to support diaspora development and to promote intra-Africa migration. African countries are becoming war zones. Hence, the absence of this supportive environment, given the resurgence of coups and authoritarian regimes, has not provided the enabling economic environment for the African Union diaspora initiative to thrive and for Africans to move freely.

In addition, there has been an ongoing debate about whether AU diaspora initiatives only foster international migration and brain drain rather than addressing the factors pushing Africa into migration. Scholars such as Asong (2018: 247) have advocated for policies that can increase intra-African migration. The reason for such a position is not far-fetched. Asong (2018: 247) contends that the damages done by brain drain cannot be equalled by remittance inflow. Put differently, remittance inflow does not tell the whole story about Africa's development dilemma. However, Asong (2018: 247) argues that, unlike migration to developed countries, intra-Africa migration and the pursuit of development and a safe Africa will contribute significantly to realising the Africa we want. However, despite the AU effort to improve intra-African migration through various Regional Economic Cooperation (RECs) through the free movement policies, the increasing

wave of xenophobia, as in the case of South Africa and Ghana (economic protectionism), has been a major hindrance. However, while Asong's argument remains logical, Adams (2013) - claims that increasing streams of remittance inflows in Africa is better than Western or Asian loans leading to debt crises and perpetual underdevelopment. According to Adams (2013: 25), unlike loans, remittance targets are always met without conditionality, hindering African countries' economic growth. However, while the article does not justify whose argument is more logical, it contends that the development of Africa's socio-economic and political space remains an important way to reposition Africa and its diaspora in global affairs as active rather than passive actors.

The rise of xenophobia and protectionist economic policy, which are products of securitisation have endangered intra-Africa migration. Since 2007, the Nigerian business community in Ghana has raised the alarm over the Ghana Investment Promotion Acts (GIPA) (865), 2013. The Ghana Investment Promotion Act (GIPA) is a protectionist economic policy specifically designed to increase Ghana's domestic economy regarding trade and employment by restricting non-Ghanaians' economic participation. The GIPA outlined conditions that must be met by foreigners interested in investing in Ghana's domestic economy and the Ghana retail sector. In Zambia, there are records of xenophobic attacks directed toward the Rwandanese in the country. Also, the case of South Africa stands out regarding xenophobia and migration securitisation leading to xenophobic violence, deportation and harassment of immigrants (Adeoye, 2018a; Adeoye, 2018b). For instance, between 2008 and 2021, several attacks targeted African migrants. Xenowatch data further reveals that the 796 xenophobic attacks have resulted in 121, 945 total displacements, with a total shop of 4, 693 shops looted and a total depth of 588 immigrants (Jean et al. 2021: 6).

Intra-Africa migration has also been hampered by the lack of sustainable infrastructures needed to facilitate the movement of people and goods, such as access roads and railways linking African countries. As rightly observed by the IOM/African Union (2018: 60-64), even

where there is political will, resources are often insufficient in most member states to standardize travel documents and efficiently inspect these travel documents at the national border. For instance, using biometric machines or document-reading devices (to enhance security and facilitate faster clearance of travellers at the border) and putting in place border management information and security systems all require substantial resources when most governments operate on wafer-thin budgets. This will frustrate efforts meant to facilitate the free movement of people in Africa. These are very important since scrapping visas alone does not automatically guarantee the free movement of people.

Furthermore, an appreciable number of African countries within the sub-region still fall within the bracket of low-income countries with low income and perennial economic challenges similar to countries of origin, such as unemployment, inflation, and income differences. However, given the major drivers of migrant decisions, such as poverty need to access adequate means of livelihood, the choice of migrating to Europe, North America, the Middle East or Asia becomes higher. Put differently, intra-Africa migration cannot thrive when African countries that will serve as a point of destination are experiencing economic surges that cannot withstand the immigrants' population, thereby leading to securitisation policies. These factors have significant implications for human mobility in the sub-region, which affect the realization of the Free Movement Protocol.

The increasing bureaucracy attached to individual movement and goods and services contributes to intra-Africa migration challenges. Despite the progress in the movement across the sub-region, immigrants still encounter many barriers as they attempt to migrate, given the incoherence in policy and requirements to cross states' borders. Related to the above is the exponential increase in irregular and illegal migration, which makes African countries tighten the loose at their borders based on security reasons. The above challenges affect the realization of the free movement policy under the African Union auspices.

Conclusion

The chapter has examined the development of the African continent from the perspective of migration and the diaspora. Over time, matters of migration (intra-Africa) and the Africans in the diaspora did not receive significant attention. However, Africa had enormous natural resources, the exponential increase in brain drain since the period of the Atlantic Slave Trade through the Structural Adjustment Programme and current post-colonial nation-building trajectories. Africans in the diaspora have increased exponentially. However, the wave of migration remains a challenge. The African Union, through the making of Africans in the diaspora willing to contribute to the development of Africa, the sixth zone seeks to reconstruct the diaspora's identity as problems of Africa's development to partners in development. Based on the established AU platform, African countries have increased their diaspora engagement policies to facilitate the diaspora's involvement in their homeland's political economy. Also, the African Union has not only focused on migration development from abroad, but the organization has also contributed immensely to developing intra-Africa migration through the use of the Regional Economic Cooperation platform to promote the Free Movement Policy initiative needed to drive internal economic reforms and challenge Africa's dependence on the wider world. Through the Regional Economic Cooperation, the African Union has been extending the tentacles of the Free Movement Policy to promote greater integration and development. However, despite the African Union's effort to ensure African countries benefit immensely from the global migration-development platform, the process has been faced with several challenges, among which include terrorism and insurgency, the rise of authoritarian regimes and coups, economic deterioration of African states, the rise of migration securitization policies, absence of infrastructure. The article recommends that the AU focus on rebuilding Africa based on its Agenda 2063 by providing sustainable migration governance architecture that makes Africa a destination zone, coordinating Africans in diaspora for Africa's development and fostering African socio-economic and political emancipation to reduce African migration quest.

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