TERRORISM IN AFRICA AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA AND KENYA

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Abstract

This study intends to examine different indicators of terrorist operations related to socio-economic development, reflecting the similarities and differences of their operations in the African continent to provide a constructive management strategy for curbing perennial terrorist attacks in Africa. The research was anchored on the contagious theory of terrorism, which adopted the influence of the unrestricted flow of information and ideas in explaining the spread of 'domestic' terrorism into a transnational network. The relevant data for this study were elicited through primary and secondary sources. The research reveals that it is the same terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab and Boko Haram that are aligning with each other and other foreign terrorist organizations like the al-Qaeda senior leaders in Pakistan that are wreaking havoc in society. Secondly, it reveals that the intended African Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 is unrealizable in the face of unaddressed terrorist operations. Subsequently, it recommends collaborative action among the internal and external actors on counter-terrorism action for effective management.

Keyword: Comparative analysis, terrorism, Security, Management, Development

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Introduction:

One of the most direct and serious security threats facing governments around the world is terrorism. Terrorism has gained international attention because of its devastating effect on nation-states and societies. Its adverse social and political ramifications have had very significant economic consequences, as they have forced governments around the world to finance counter-terrorism measures, which in turn have burdened the economy, primarily through adverse effects on defence budgets as well as general budget figures. Terrorism has negatively affected not only the national economies but also the international economies. Terrorism is a global trend that involves the premeditated use of threats or violence by faceless individuals or groups to cause fear, destruction, or death, especially against unarmed targets, property, or infrastructure in a state, for political or economic gains. Terrorism is defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (Krueger & Maleckova, 2013).

It has increasingly become a global problem that requires concerted action by the community of nations (Omeje & Githigaro, 2010). The sub-Saharan African region has experienced prolonged and severe terrorist activities. It is the most fundamental source of insecurity in developing countries, and its primary source is religious fanaticism and intolerance, particularly in Muslim-dominated states. Kenya and Nigeria are among the sub-Saharan African countries that are engulfed by the current wave of global terrorism. The current terrorism attacks in Kenya and Nigeria have been the turning points of East Africa and West Africa, respectively, serving as business, transportation, and tourist hubs. These two countries have been the most outward-looking African countries with their linkages and relationships with the U.S., Europe, the Middle East, and some countries on the Asian continent.

However, in the past two decades, Kenya and Nigeria have been targets of various terror attacks attributed to terrorist elements (Aronson, 2013). The first sign that Kenya had entered the terrorist circuit was in December 1980, when terrorists sympathetic to the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) bombed part of the world-famous five-star Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi. At least 16 lives were lost, and hundreds of people were injured. In August 1998, the US Embassy building in Kenya was bombed, resulting in at least 250 deaths. In 1998, Kenya, along with Tanzania, suffered terrorist attacks that collectively killed over 250 people and injured nearly 5,000 others, mostly Kenyans (Muendo 2003). Then, in 2002, another terrorist attack in Kenya killed 13 people and injured 80 (Daily Nation, November 29, 2002). In addition, the Al Shabaab terrorist assault in September 2013 on a Nairobi shopping mall popular with Americans and other expatriates significantly attracted the attention of international bodies due to the constant terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of both Kenyan citizens and foreigners.

Similar to the above, Nigeria has experienced unending incidents of terrorist attacks, such as bomb blasts and other violent killings. Terrorism in Nigeria is an Islamic insurgency with a political undertone by a faceless group based in the northern region of the country allegedly masterminded by Boko Haram, which takes into account the legitimate political, social, and economic grievances of the segment of the population (Okah, 2014). Boko Haram has moved from drive-by shootings and gasoline bombs to suicide attacks using large and increasingly sophisticated explosives. The group has so far waged audacious attacks on an array of public places, including police stations, prisons, schools, places of worship, media houses, and the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja (Agbiboa 2013c; Forest 2012). The attack on the Nigerian police headquarters in Abuja by Boko Haram is believed to be the first suicide attack in Nigeria (Maiangwa, 2012). A suicide bomber that struck the U.N. building left 23 people dead and 16 wounded. According to Oluokun (2014), Nigeria has lost up to 1,500 lives in the north since 2009, since the insurgency of Boko Haram.

Several factors explain why Kenya and Nigeria have been victims of past terrorist attacks. The main factors are geography, ethnic composition, political stability, unstable neighbours, poverty, and Islamic fundamentalism (Adan, 2005). The porosity of Nigeria's borders has serious security implications for the country. Given the porousness

of our borders, as well as our weak security system, weapons and small arms, get into Nigeria easily from other countries. Small arms and light weapons proliferation and the availability of these weapons have enabled militant groups and criminal gangs to have easy access to arms (Hazen & Horner, 2007). National security is the priority of any nation-state in the world. Beland (2005) defined insecurity as a state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection, i.e., a lack of or inadequate freedom from danger. Terrorism has contributed to a national security threat that is capable of disintegrating the country; it results in the killing of hundreds of people and the wanton destruction of property worth billions of naira through bombings (Abimbola and Adesote, 2012).

The groups have become more vexatious and successful, which seems to have thwarted government institutions and development processes, especially in terrorist-challenged zones. They mount attacks against both domestic and international establishments, with threats of expansion beyond their shores (Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2014). These attacks on domestic and international establishments in Nigeria, like the UN Building in Abuja, have raised the argument of whether or not it should be recognized as a foreign terrorist organization (Adefuye, 2012; Oritsejafor, 2012; Campbell, 2012; and Meehan, 2012). The current challenge of terrorism to physical security is threatening the very foundation of African nationhood (Robert, 2014). It appears that terrorist groups in East Africa, Kenya (al-Shabaab), and West Africa, Nigeria (Boko Haram), were aligned with each other and other foreign terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda senior leaders in Pakistan (Ham, 2012). The simultaneous records of insecurity resulting from the terrorist attacks on different parts of sub-Saharan Africa and the attacks on international institutions in the specified areas justify the imperative of comparative analyses of terrorism and its impacts on national development with the view to establishing holistic counter-terrorism strategies that can drastically eliminate it.

Statement of the Problem

African countries hardly ever boast of lasting stability and security of life and property. Many countries in Africa have experienced a series of catastrophes ranging from civil war, coup d'états, poor economic development, war, and, last of all, terrorism. The people of Kenya and Nigeria have had to face the terrible situation of terrorism, which seems to have defied meaningful solutions. It violates the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights, and freedom and remains an affront to the Global Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the values and principles enunciated in Africa's Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU). The terrifying wave of terrorist acts in Kenya and Nigeria has become a matter of discourse among scholars, as it seems that Haram has established links with al-Shabaab in Kenya. partly the likelihood of the penetration of international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah in Kenya and Nigeria that might have established networks that might have been providing Boko Haram and al-Shabaab with logistics support and recruits.

The terrifying wave of terrorist acts on security management appears to have had dire humanitarian and economic consequences for the populace now and shortly in Kenya and Nigeria. Oche (2014) points out that terrorists in Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria target important places such as embassies, foreign banks, and tourist destinations, which appear to have had a likely crippling effect on the national development of the countries. The terrorist groups in their respective countries had caught the attention of the international community following a series of violent attacks. According to Olowoselu (2014), the US Embassy bombings in Kenya in 1998, the Mombasa Bombings of 2002, and the case of the Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria looking into the July 2009 Massacre and the vehicle-borne improvised explosive that destroyed the UN Building in 2011 may drag down the pace of development in the countries as important places are affected. The bombing of a Nairobi shopping mall with Americans and other expatriates in September 2013, claimed by Al Shabaab, draws fresh attention to the comparative analysis of terrorism and national development in Kenya and Nigeria.

The increasing coordination and sophistication add further complication to the festering development and security challenges in Africa, especially in Kenya and Nigeria. This paper, therefore, distinctively undertakes the comparative analysis of terrorism and national development in Kenya and Nigeria with the view to establishing a holistic counter-terrorism strategy applicable to the African continent. The broad objective of this study is to explore the comparative relationship between terrorism attacks and national development in Kenya and Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study are to:

1. find out how a security challenge induced by terrorism negatively impacts national development in Kenya Nigeria; and
2. determine the counter-terrorism mechanisms to be applied to eliminate terrorism operations in both countries.

Terrorism Operation in Africa

For over a decade, the Horn of Africa has been considered a major source of global terrorism. In 1993, 18 American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu, Somalia, during an attack that some analysts attribute to Islamic terrorists. Five years later, terrorists struck in the region again, bombing American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people and injuring more than 4,000. In October 2000, the U.S.S. Cole was struck by terrorists in Yemen, just off the east coast of Africa, in an attack that claimed the lives of 17 American sailors. In November 2002, al Qaeda-backed terrorists bombed a hotel and attempted to down an Israeli airliner with a shoulder-held surface-to-air missile near Mombasa, Kenya.

Terrorists have carried out attacks against non-combatant targets, causing massive destruction using viscous assaults. Terrorism is a tactic used by a wide variety of organizations towards realizing a given objective, and terrorism cannot be defeated at all without considering the root causes of terrorism. The Institute for Safety and Security and Crisis Management (2008) agreed with the above view when it argued that the key to successfully dealing with terrorism lies in understanding its root and trigger causes. If we are to defeat

terrorism, it is our duty, and indeed our interest, to try to understand this deadly phenomenon, and carefully examine what works, and what does not, in fighting it." (United Nations Secretary-General, 2003). Africa is a good target of global terrorism because of a combination of geographic, regional, historical, political, economic and sociocultural factors. Some of these factors are direct justifications for attacks while others facilitate the attacks (Otiso, 2009).

In agreement with the view of Otiso, Silberfein (2003), states that key motivations of terrorism include ethnic conflict, political exclusion and the resultant insurrections, illicit drugs, environmental degradation, religious differences and socio-economic exclusion or marginalization. In recognition of the above, Keta (2013) summaries the causes and sustaining factors of terrorism as follows: Once started, insurrections and associated acts of terrorism can be sustained by: basing operations in relatively secure locales that are inaccessible to the state; taking advantage of locally available resources such as minerals such as in Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo and illicit drugs (e.g., opium in Afghanistan); creating a network that facilitates exchange of local resources for weapons and other basic amenities, and availability of easily traversed borders and accessible ports.

The common cause for the rise of terrorism is economic deprivation. For instance, Ted Gurr (2011) links economic disparity with the propensity of individuals to resort to violent political action. In the Middle East where much of the current wave of religious terrorism originates, most people are trapped in poverty and underdevelopment despite the region's oil wealth. Frustrations with the slow pace of social reforms in the region, coupled with poor governance and lack of social services facilitates the proliferation of terrorist groups that purport to offer solutions to the poor living conditions (Cronin 2002:38). Concerning the above, bad governance that is prevailing in the developing world with its antecedent non-existent social services, and poverty gave rise to complex and destructive action of terrorism across the Africa countries.

Despite the above, the globalization of terrorism as well as a notable dispersal in the geography of terrorist acts (Cronin 2002:44) is

most worrisome because a terrorist organization from one part of the world can launch attacks in another part of the globe not achieve their official goals, but to experience social solidarity with other members thereby complicating the process of identifying terrorism perpetrators. For instance in October 2011, a coordinated operation between the Somali military and the Kenyan military began against the Al-Shabaab group of insurgents in southern Somalia. The mission was officially led by the Somali army, with the Kenyan forces providing a support role. Since then, a series of explosions have rocked various areas in Kenya, bombings which are believed to have been retaliatory attacks by Al-Shabaab (Wanyama, 2011). According to the US Embassy in the past half-decade, the global reach of terrorism has been made possible by the explosion of modern global transport, communications, and media (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004:43, Cronin 2002:37).

Regrettably, technological development which is the major determinant of development turns and becomes a tool that aggravates terrorism in Africa. In line with the above, as asserted by Mustapha (2002) acts of terrorism have been exacerbated by technology such as the internet and satellite television increased radicalization of youths, especially through religious fundamentalism, poverty, as well as increased travel and employment around the globe.

Theoretical Framework

The Contagion Theory of Terrorism The Contagion theory of terrorism is a distinct methodology and theory of collective behaviour that originated from the study of Gustave Le Bon in 1895. This theory postulated that col-lective behaviours of mob panics and violence, organization of social move-ments, rumour dissemination, fashion choices, and the emergence of fads in one region tended to occur in another region as a result of social influence and network that can exert effect or behavioural change within an individual. This theory stresses that the propensity for certain behaviours exhibited by one group to be copied by another is either in the vicinity of the original group or has been exposed to media coverage describing the activities of the original actor. Contagion theory of terrorism received attention from social

science researchers from as far back as the mid-19th century. Early investigations include cultural diffusion research performed by English anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor, examinations of innovation adoption conducted by French sociologist and social psychologist Gabriel Tarde, and explorations of the collective mind dy-namic by French social psychologist Gustave Le Bon. Le Bon in particular helped popularize the idea of so-cial contagion in his seminal study of crowd-induced panics. Le Bon stressed that Several studies have demonstrated that the occurrence of terrorist attacks is far from random, rather that there is a clear trend of the periodical cycle in the occurrence of terrorist attacks, or waves of terrorism

Researchers in the 20th century, including British psychologist William McDougall and American sociologists Herbert Blumer, Robert Park, Ralph Turner, and Neil Smelser subsequently provided more substantive ways of examining and conceptualiz-ing aspects of social contagion. The later supporters of the theory argued that A high level of mob panic and violence and the emergence of fads terrorism in one month is likely to be followed by more incidents in the next month, suggesting that the decision by terrorist groups to launch an attack is influenced by similar attacks elsewhere, hence, the 'concept of contagion'. These periodic 'waves' of terrorism may be partly explained by the desire of terrorists to guarantee newsworthiness and consequently, media access (Weimann and Brosius 1988: 500). According to Weimann and Brosius (1988), there is 'accumulating empirical evidence pointing to the contagiousness of terrorism' with regards to the timing of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, (Crenshaw (1983) and Midlarsky (1980) state that high levels of Fads operation in one country often are associated with increased incidents of terrorism in neighbouring states in the region, whether by the same organization, by 'second-generation' groups, by foreign sympathizers and coalition partners, or simply by imitators. The theory has the attributes of imitation and simulation, in other words, the gang groups learn from each other, and successful operations in one country are imitated by groups elsewhere.

Application of the Theory

The contagion theory of terrorism extensively illustrates the terrorist operation and its implications on national development in Africa: Kenya and Nigeria. This theory explains the influence of the rapid and largely unrestricted flow of information and ideas in explaining the spread of 'domestic' terrorism into a transnational network. The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001 and the attacks on civilian targets in Europe, particularly the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 7/7 London bombings of 2005, truly brought foreign-bred terrorist violence into the domestic sphere in different countries of the world. The proponents of this theory stressed that terrorist operations in one country have a spillover effect on other neighbouring countries.

These explained the uprising of the terrorism operations in the African continent. In the aftermath of 9/11, many countries of the world aligned with the United States (US) in the 'war against terrorism', to a large extent, influenced the same-minded individuals, especially in the Muslim countries Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Afghanistan, Kenya and Nigeria to unite and conspire against common enemies. Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda, al Shabaab and Boko Haram have become transnational organisations that thrive on the opportunities opened by new technologies and communications channels. Not only are they able to coordinate their activities through such channels, but they are also able to raise funds, network and coordinate their activities across national borders and frontiers with greater ease than would have been considered feasible just two decades ago. Groups such as al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are highly networked organisations linked together on a worldwide basis.

They share information, strategies and tactics and they disseminate propaganda materials as a means of recruitment and socialisation into their theology of death. This justifies the statement made by Len: "terrorist attacks are far from random, rather that there is a clear trend of the periodical cycle in the occurrence of terrorist attacks, or waves of terrorism." It is a planned operation that occurs simultaneously in different countries by the same kind of group with a

common identity and enemy. According to contagion theory, the operation records a similar effect on the development of any country due to the similarities of the target of their operation on economic/commercial institutions and the destruction of valuable property that attracts regional and international attention. For instance, the rise of Boko Haram in the northeast has claimed responsibility for recent suicide attacks on churches in different parts of the northeast states, the bombing of Police headquarters and UN Headquarters in Abuja and the intensification of activities by al-Qaeda in Kenya. On August 7th, 1998, the US embassy in Nairobi was attacked and over 200 lives were lost, in 2013, the militant group al Shabaab killed over 80 people at the Nairobi shopping mall, and many other attack tourism centres in Kenya has economic consequences in both countries.

The cost of terrorist violence on the development of Kenya and Nigeria extensively depicts the relevance of the contagion theory of terrorism. According to Len the founder of the contagion, the outbreak of violence in any state directly affects all institutions and agencies of the government, hence constraining, socio-economic, political and environmental development. Terrorist incidents have economic consequences by diverting foreign direct investment (FDI), destroying infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security, or limiting trade and consequent dire humanitarian conditions. This is certainly true concerning terrorism. The shock caused by these attacks made the relationship between external and internal security that much more tangible and made everyone more aware that external and internal security were part of a single whole rather than separate dimensions.

Research Procedure

The research design adopted in this study is documentary. Documentary research design is a useful technique which helps in gathering, investigating and analyzing information or materials already in existence. The data for this study were generated through secondary sources. The relevant materials on terrorism and national development in Kenya and Nigeria and the roles of other regional and international

partners like the European Union and the United States on terrorism and counter-terrorism operations were obtained from textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, periodicals and seminars.

Terrorism, Insecurity and Sustainable Development in Africa

The Relationship between Security and sustainable development are inextricably linked; the security threats have negative sustainable development implications, including contests over natural resources, spillover effects of environmental degradation, economic and social inequalities, economic and political, migration, and natural disasters, among others (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2015). The most fundamental source of insecurity in Africa today is terrorism which is traceable to religious fanaticism and intolerance, particularly in Islam-dominated states. The continued wanton destruction of lives and property by Boko Haram and the al Shabaab insurgency has been worrisome and cannot be a way of life. The insecurity induced by the activities of these groups has degenerated to an intolerable level exposing everybody to danger and heightened socio-economic decadence.

Nigeria is blessed with rich natural and human resources; however, a preponderant range of poverty amidst plenty in Africa undoubtedly explains the inherent and perilous level of insecurity that has bedevilled the African continent. Crime and violence are increasingly recognized as serious obstacles to social and human capital formation and sustainable economic development. Emphasizing the implication of insecurity on achieving sustainable development, Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpor-Robaro (2013) state thus: "Therefore, security is crucial for sustainable development. In the absence of security, economic growth and development cannot be sustained as they destroy economic, human, and social capital. Under conditions of peace and security, people and government can direct their efforts and resources towards improving human life". The worsening state of insecurity in third-world countries has claimed a lot of lives, stagnated development and destroyed the economy of the area.

According to Global Terrorism Index (2022) Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 48% of global terrorism deaths. The Sahel is home to the world's fastest-growing and most deadly terrorist groups. The Sahel region in sub-Saharan Africa is now the epicentre of terrorism, with the Sahel accounting for more terrorism deaths in 2022 than both South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) combined. Deaths in the Sahel constituted 43 per cent of the global total in 2022, compared to just one per cent in 2007. Of particular concern are two countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, which accounted for 73 per cent of terrorism deaths in the Sahel in 2022 and 52 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa.

This scenario hurts sustainable development efforts in the African continent. Human resources are important assets towards achieving sustainable development, thus, insufficient resources have a negative implication on sustainable development. Terrorism incidents in Kenya and Nigeria have socio-economic implications and spillover costs on neighbouring countries in Africa and beyond. It revealed that Nigeria went from being ranked the 32nd country affected by terrorism out of 158 in 2002 to holding the number 3 spot in 20202, besides, Nigeria has moved from the country with the fifth highest levels of fatalities in 2013 to the second highest in 2014. Kenya was ranked 18th among the countries that felt the impact of terrorism across the globe in 2015. In the absence of security, socio-economic development cannot be sustained as it destroys economic, human and social capital. Terrorist incidents have economic consequences by diverting foreign direct investment (FDI), destroying infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security, or limiting trade, which negatively curbs economic growth (Enders and Sandler, 2015). The global economic implication is that the activities of Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Boko Haram in Nigeria have directly affected bilateral trade between Kenya, Nigeria and other nations of the world. Both groups have carried out large-scale operations with lasting global attention and socio-economic implications. For example, Tourism has been one of the leading industries in Kenya as well as a major contributor towards the Kenyan economy (Gitu, 2003). Kenya has relied heavily on international

tourists. Following acts of Al-Shabaab terrorism, such as the bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya in 1998; the bombing of Paradise Beach Hotel in Mombasa, a major city; and a near-fatal rocket-launched grenade attack on an aircraft.

Consequently, the tourism industry suffered a great blow. Acts of terrorism curtail travel activity terrorism that targets tourism can be viewed as a major disaster to the destination and the ensuing events can give birth to a serious tourism crisis (Sonmez, Apostolopoulos, and Tarlow, 1999). In addition, the (Al Shabaab) terrorist assault in September 2013 on a Nairobi shopping mall popular with Americans and other expatriates all had similar economic implications. Following these attacks of terrorism, Western governments led by the United States of America and Britain issued travel advisories to all their citizens against travelling to Kenya in 2003. The Kenya Tourism Federation stated that the suspension of British Airways regular and charter planes flying to Nairobi, coupled with travel advisories, closed down access to 90% of Kenya's overseas markets. The country was losing an estimated amount of over 1 Billion Kenya shillings per week.

In addition to the revenue loss, at stake were over 500,000 direct jobs and another 2.5 million indirect jobs (Gitu, 2003). Unfortunately, a terrorist assault on Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall that killed 67 people in September 2013 a raid on Garissa University in northeast Kenya that killed almost 150 and the kidnapping of several in April 2015, combined with spillover effects from Europe's financial woes, have hurt Kenya's tourism industry and its investment climate BBC (2015). Kenya increased its defence budget by 20 percent to $861 million, Kenya government increase their defense budgets at a faster pace in the face of new terrorism threats from groups like the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab, The largest economy spent Sh75.8 billion ($819 million) on its army last year, down from Sh79.7 billion ($861 million) in 2013, as per the report published on Monday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri). According to Duale (2015), the government gave the police an additional $106.38 million and the defence and intelligence departments an extra $170.21 million. Despite the internal spending on the Kenya Defense Force, the US has donated 9.5 billion

Kenyan shillings (US $92.4 million) to the KDF to fund soldier training, new equipment acquisitions and sustain the counter-terror war against Somali militant group al-Shabab (Nkala, 2015).

According to the Stockholm International Peace (2015), Kenya's total spending for the 2015/2016 fiscal year rose to $21.27 billion up from $19.14 billion in 2014/2015. Recently, Kenya's government allocated much of its revenue towards fighting terrorism. Kenya's defence budget is worth $1.4 billion in 2022 and is expected to achieve a CAGR of more than 3% during 2023-2027. In 2023 budgetary allocation, National Security gets Ksh317.8 billion with the National Intelligence Service (NIS) getting Ksh46.1 billion. The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) has been allocated Ksh128.4 billion while the National Police Service has been allocated Ksh93.9 billion. The Prisons Service has been allocated Ksh28.3 billion (Muli, 2023). All the same, the Boko Haram insurgence in Northern Nigeria has almost crippled economic activities in that region. Also, the activities of other militia groups in other parts of the country pose a serious threat to the economic health of these regions. Since July 2009 when Boko Haram engaged Nigerian security forces in a short-lived anti-government uprising, the group has grown to become a serious national, regional, and international concern.

The group attracted the first major international attention in August 2011 when it bombed the United Nations building in Abuja, killing 23 people. Unfortunately, many economic activities have been closed as a result of the violent activities of Boko Haram. Bisuga (2012) corroborate "many telecommunication companies have lost their masts and base transceiver stations in Plateau, Gombe, Bornu, Yobe, Bauchi, and Kano. Each costs an average of 40 million naira and 160 million to build a single mast", Insecurity in the Nigerian environment induced by the Boko Haram had crippled the peaceful economic activities of the indigenes. UN agrees with Bisuga (2015) when it states that commercial and business activities have crumbled and some have fled because of high levels of insecurity. Banks and their customers are operating under difficult situations and have reduced their business hours for security reasons. About 40% per cent of industries have been shut down leading to the scourge of unemployment. Small and Medium scale industries

have relocated to Abuja. Many people have lost their lives and others rendered homeless. Moreover, agriculture and foreign investments are affected. Insecurity has created a food crisis, such that prices of basic food items, like rice, yam, beans and fresh tomatoes have risen (Azinge and Bello 2011).

This is a serious economic challenge as the cycle of poverty, hunger and unemployment would further drive the disadvantaged and marginalized people in the area to crimes and religious extremism. World Bank Reports (2011) on "Conflict, Security and Development" reveals that about 1.5 billion people's lives in Nigeria were affected by Boko Haram-induced violence which has exacerbated human misery and disrupted development. North Central/ Eastern states in Nigeria (Kano, Adamawa, Bauchi, Bornu, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe), that are currently under the shadow of insurgency are vast areas with great potential, but remain the poorest part of Nigeria because of the activities of terrorism in the areas. Furthermore, as a way of curbing terrorist operations, Nigeria's budgetary allocation to the security/defence sector is the largest. Commenting on the Nigerian government budget allocation into the security and defence sector, Oladesu (2012) states that it is five times greater than the spending of Cote d'Ivoire and almost 15 times the size of Ghana's spending. Since Buhari assumed office on May 29, 2015, his regime has allocated approximately N11.18tn as a security budget. This figure covers budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Police Affairs, National Security Adviser and the Police Service Commission.

TABLE I. Budget Allocations for Security from 2008-2023

S/N	YEAR	AMOUNT
1	2008	N 444.6 billion
2	2009	N 233 billion
3	2010	N 264 billion
4	2011	N 920 billion
5	2012	N 921.91 billion
6	2013	N923 billion
7	2014	N923 billion

8	2015	N934 billion
9	2016	N978.72bn
10	2017	N1.12tn
11	2018	, N1.26tn
12	2019	N1.33tn
13	2020	N1.71tn
14	2021	N1.87tn
15	2022	N2.27tn
16	2023	

Source: Okoagu, 2015 & Sami, 2022

According to Sami (2022), budgetary allocation to the security sector rose to N978.72bn in 2016, N1.12tn in 2017, N1.26tn by 2018, N1.33tn in 2019, N1.71tn in 2020, and N1.87tn in 2021 for all aforementioned ministries and agencies. By 2022, the budgetary allocation increased to N2.27tn, showing an increase of 262.39 per cent when compared to the allocation in 2015. Despite that, President, Major General Muhammadu Buhari's political administration on April 4, 2018, approved $1bn for military equipment, following a meeting with security chiefs at the Presidential Villa, Abuja. To this effect, The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2023) describes Nigeria as one of the largest spenders in the area of military expenditures. Contrary to the above financial commitment from the federal government of Nigeria, the country emerged as the eighth least peaceful country in Africa as it ranked 146th on the Global Peace Index out of 163 countries covered in the report. Thus, sustainable development bids elude the state.

Yet Nigeria continues to face attacks from the extremist Boko Haram group, whose activities have claimed over 11,000 lives in the last five years. Sustainable Development Implications of Insecurity in Africa In the absence of security, socio-economic development cannot be sustained as it destroys economic, human and social capital. In a cursory analysis of the economic implication of the terrorist operation between Kenya and Nigeria, the two countries have similar experiences,


it constituted constraints on local economic activities and finally affected the foreign direct investment in both countries.

Besides, the impact of violence on the hospitality industry in Nigeria is devastating. People have relocated hotel businesses which have generated revenue from terrorist ridden zones to other safe areas in the South. One of the obvious economic concerns of the activities of Boko Haram is the instant drop in foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the World Investment Report (WIR) (2013), FDI flows into Nigeria dropped by 21% in just one year from $5.199 billion in 2011 to $3.304 billion in 2012. The loss of $1.9 billion for a country in desperate need of money – such as Nigeria – was a staggering blow. Many foreign investors are scared of investing in the economy because of insecurity and kidnapping occasioned by Boko Haram terrorist activities., many are looking for better safer environments to invest Farmers are scared of going to farms (Bamidele 2012). Nigeria has lost a lot of FDI due to insecurity challenges we are having in the country, there are so many factors dragging the Nigerian economy down depriving investors from investing in the country and so many that can invest in the country to help the GDP.

Currently, Oyekanmi (2022) reported that Nigeria's foreign direct investment has dwindled significantly recently, hitting a record low of $698.8 million in 2021, in 2022, total FDI into Nigeria only added up to a paltry $3.3bn according to the World Bank. Even at its all-time high in 2008, Nigerian FDI only totalled $4.7bn. Last year, as many as 32 of Nigeria's 36 states did not attract one dollar in foreign direct investment (FDI) during the first quarter of 2022. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), only Lagos, Oyo, Katsina Anambra and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) attracted any FDI during the first three months of 2022. According to the NBS' Nigeria's capital importation, the total value of capital imported into Nigeria in the first quarter of 2022 stood at $1.6bn, compared with $2.2bn in the preceding quarter. Basically, in too many sectors and too many states, Nigeria is not attracting the required capital to get going. According to (Anyadike, 2012); this slow economic growth and development has been due to the lack of inflow of foreign investment. In the same line of thought,

The Nigerian economy has been ravaged by several problems, ranging from macroeconomic factors such as inflation, unemployment, and ease of doing business to socio-economic factors such as banditry, kidnapping, and insurgency, hence affecting the sentiments of foreign investors towards the economy. Incredibly, foreign direct investment fell by 30% across sub-Saharan Africa. The figure below shows the relatively small values of FDI inflow into Sub-Sahara Africa, though the value appears small in absolute terms, nevertheless, they have a greater impact on their economies than what the absolute value suggests. Generally, the FDI to African states is low compared to other developed continents. FDI hindered employment and led to a decline in gross domestic product.

Table: II. FDI Inflow into the Different Continents



Source: UNCTAD 2021

Specifically, the African continent is lagging, none of the African countries is included in the top global 10 FDI destinations for 2021. The list of the top 10 countries are listed below

TABLE: III: Top Ten Countries With Highest Foreign Direct Investment

S/N	COUNTRY	S/N	COUNTRY	S/N	COUNTRY
1	US - $4.97trn	4	Luxembourg- $3.33trM	7	Singapore- $1.79trn
2	Netherlands - $4.33trn	5	UK- $2.61trn	8	Ireland- $1.36trn
3	China - $3.57trn	6	Hong Kong - $1.91trn	9	Switzerland - $1.2trn
10	Germany - $1.1trn				

Source: Global Economic Statistic Report, 2022

If we are serious about getting out of our economic ruin, African leaders need to be given foreign direct investment targets which must be met unfailingly. No matter how you look at it, Africa has no choice other than to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) if it wants to expand and diversify its economy.

Summary

In summary, the study set out to explore the comparative relationship between terrorism and national development between Kenya and Nigeria. To effectively and efficiently achieve this objective, we hypothesize there are significant relationships between the formidable dimension of terrorism operations and dire humanitarian conditions in Kenya and Nigeria, and terrorism-induced security challenges negatively impact socio-economic growth in Kenya and Nigeria.

In this milieu of our hypothesis, we adopt the contagion terrorism theory. The theoretical framework enables us to understand the reasons there was the simultaneous operation of terrorist operations in a region and the likely implication of it in the socio-economic and political development of the country. Using secondary sources in data collection and content analysis to analyse our findings and hypothesis, we discovered that the formidable dimension of terrorism operations in Kenya and Nigeria constituted humanitarian conditions in Kenya and

Nigeria which later hampered socio-economic development in both countries respectively.

Recommendations

Drawing from our findings of the studies above, we proffer the following recommendations;

- As a way to ameliorate the problem, we assumed that a unified/continental strategy is important because the threats are common. These threats present similar characteristics, and African countries suffer from similar vulnerabilities. Each state alone will not be able to fight this scourge. The AU's Peace and Security Council could be more active, PSC should institute a sub-committee on counter-terrorism and equip them with many resources so that they can bridge the security gap in the African continent
- The government security personnel both military and police need to be equipped with new modern sophisticated equipment. The border patrol needs to be well secured. The government has to investigate the internal and external sponsors of al-Shababal and Boko Haram and block the financial flow internally and externally so that the government will have control over the insurgency. Terrorist groups profit from a lack of coordination among states, continental strategy is important because the threats are common.
- Government at all levels in respective countries should strengthen humanitarian partnerships with aid organizations, including local and international NGOs such as the European Union. In this way, country-based pooled funds could be raised and humanitarian assistance such as food, emergency shelter, water and sanitation assistance can be provided for IDPs and refugees and human dignity maintained. The collaboration of the international humanitarian partners in Kenya and Nigeria can help to address the dire humanitarian situation response.

Conclusions

Terrorism constitutes a ubiquitous global threat. Getting squeezed elsewhere, Islamist militants are increasingly finding the African continent an at-tractive place to operate. The operation of the al Shabaab / al-Qaeda in Kenya and Boko Haram in Nigeria threaten socio-economic development in the respective countries. The elimination of these threats should be the number one goal of governments in Kenya and Nigeria at all levels as the terrorist-ridden countries cannot achieve any significant development amidst insecurity and violence. This state of affairs calls for a holistic, inclusive approach to counterterrorism. This included the establishment of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UNC-T Task Force) and its working groups. Lastly, it is necessary to encourage coordination and division of labour between the external actors, for example, the AU, UN, and EU along with the regional and sub-regional organisations e.g. IGAD, EAC and the national governments in the African continent, this will help in avoiding duplication of efforts by actors in the region, it will also ensure maximum use of each actors strengths and comparative advantage such as financial as well as technical expertise and knowledge in enhancing the capacities of countries and organisations in the region to prevent and counter terrorism

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